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Abstract 
While possession of unexplained property (illicit enrichment) is expressly 
criminalized under Article 419 of the 2004 Criminal Code of Ethiopia, there are 
practical problems in its prosecution, inter alia, regarding burden and standards 
of proof. Cases such as Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie demonstrate the 
confusion regarding who bears what burden, for which facts the burden would 
apply and the required standard of proof thereof. Despite efforts to use the 
prosecution of illicit enrichment as a weapon in the combat against corruption, 
there are concerns triggered by such prosecutions. There is public interest to 
punish and deter corruption and seize and confiscate the proceeds of 
corruption; meanwhile there is the need for precaution against endangering the 
right to fair trial of the accused (especially the right to presumption of 
innocence, right to remain silent, right against self-incrimination) and property 
rights of innocent persons. This Article examines issues of the allocation of 
burdens and standards of proof in the prosecution of illicit enrichment cases. It 
assesses the relevant legal framework in Ethiopia and examines some court 
practices. The author argues that the binding interpretation adopted in 
Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie case is erroneous and calls for its 
rectification in future cases that involve similar issues. 
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Introduction 
Since the entry into force of the 2004 Criminal Code of Ethiopia (as of the 9th 
of May 2005), prosecution of public servants for alleged commission of the 
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offence of possession of unexplained property has become a recurrent 
phenomenon. This holds true both in the federal government and in various 
regional states. Apart from the Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie case,1 
there are many other cases, some already decided and others still pending, 
before federal and some regional states courts. In many of these cases, litigants 
and judges are facing some practical problems, particularly regarding who must 
prove what, and to what degree.  There is an enormous confusion on whether an 
accused in such prosecution bears some form of burden of proof and, if so, 
whether the type of burden is evidential or persuasive. There is no sufficient 
clarity on the idea of easing (“shifting” or reversal) of burden of “proof”, and 
under what circumstances such an easing (reversal) of burden of proof comes to 
be operational, as well as, as to what consequence(s) would ensue. There is a 
crucial dilemma on whether the prosecution of illicit enrichment envisages a 
different approach from other normal criminal proceedings. As the offence is 
new to the Ethiopian legal system, legal professionals appear to be exceptionally 
perplexed with these and related issues arising in the criminal process. Such 
limitations and dilemmas have triggered crucial concerns and seem to pose 
serious threats to the protection of the right to fair trial of accused persons and 
the right to property of innocent persons.  
In the fight against public corruption, the general public is interested in 
seeing the enforcement of the criminal law against corrupt public servants (and 
their criminal associates) and seeks the recovery of plundered public money and 
other property.  However, society does not want to attain such goals at any cost.  
It seeks to realize these goals without setting aside other most cherished 
fundamental values such as the protection of the right to fair trial of accused 
persons. No society condones the erroneous (wrongful) conviction and 
punishment of innocent individuals and the wrongful confiscation of their 
legitimate private property.  
Where public interest competes or clashes with the rights and interests of 
individual accused persons, there is the need to strike a proper balance between 
these rights and interests. This requires weighing all rights and interests 
(individual and public) at stake, and forging an appropriate, reasonable and 
proportional means toward an acceptable solution. As some court cases 
including the Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie case demonstrate, it is 
very doubtful if due attention is given to competing and conflicting rights and 
interests arising in the prosecution of illicit enrichment cases. This raises serious 
concerns and provokes legitimate fears.  
                                           
1 See the decision of the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court in Cassation 
File No. 63014, Judgment given on Miazia 9, 2004 E.C. 
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This Article sets out to examine the various burdens and standards of proof 
that arise in the prosecution of possession of unexplained property cases. The 
first section analyzes issues of burdens of proof. Section 2 is devoted to the 
analysis of issues of standard of proof arising in such prosecutions. Section 3 
assesses the legal framework while Section 4 considers some court practices 
relating to issues of burden and standard of proof in Ethiopia. Finally, the author 
suggests that the binding interpretation adopted by the Cassation Division of the 
Federal Supreme Court be reconsidered in future cases. 
1. Burdens of Proof in Illicit Enrichment Prosecutions 
In this Section we shall closely examine how allocation of burdens of proof and 
presumption are embedded in the offence of illicit enrichment cases. Such an 
examination need to take into account the existence of varieties of ‘burdens of 
proof’ that become operational in different contexts. This author has tried to 
offer a succinct overview of the nature and operations of these varieties of 
burdens in a separate note which is concurrently published with this article. 
Such a general background of the nature and operations of evidential, tactical 
and persuasive burdens of proof facilitates our investigation of the specific 
nature and operations of the different forms of burdens of proof arising in the 
prosecution of illicit enrichment cases. This investigation also presupposes a 
sound knowledge of the relationship and mutual interactions between burdens of 
proof and various forms of presumptions. In this regard, it is necessary to pay 
attention of the form of presumption that is embodied in an offence-enacting 
provision. Furthermore, one has to carefully follow up the realization of the 
possible legal effect(s) which is/are intended to result from the interplay of the 
form of presumption with the form of burden of proof envisaged in a particular 
statutory provision.   
1.1  Allocation of Burdens of Proof in the offence of Illicit 
Enrichment  
There is the need to carefully examine the manner in which burdens of proof are 
allocated (in illicit enrichment cases) between prosecuting authorities and the 
accused. This issue further evokes questions such as who bears what burden and 
for which facts? Apart from other constitutive elements discussed elsewhere,2 
                                           
2 These pertain to ‘persons of interest’ and ‘period of check’. The other constitutive 
elements fall within the actus reus and mens rea elements of the offence. 
‘Disproportionate assets’ and ‘absence of justifications’ are components of the actus 
reus element of the offence. For a detailed discussion of the constitutive elements see 
this author’s article “Criminalization of ‘Possession of Unexplained Property’ and the 
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the offence of illicit enrichment is said to be committed when all the legal, 
material and moral elements are found fulfilled. As is true in other criminal 
cases, the particular material and moral ingredients of this offence must be 
established before a court passes a judgement of conviction against an accused. 
How is this possible and which party bears the responsibility of 
proving/disproving these elements? 
Due to the unique circumstances that surround the commission of public 
corruption offences and other variety of factors and reasons, it has been 
mentioned elsewhere that national jurisdictions and the international community 
at large are forced to recognize and to authorize different forms of special 
investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicatory methods and procedures.3 It has 
also been noted that criminalization of illicit enrichment is one such weapon that 
is purposefully created to strengthen the fight against public corruption and to 
address the difficulty faced in respect of proof. At this juncture it is of 
paramount importance to appreciate how such criminalization measure 
strengthens the fight against public corruption and how it helps in addressing the 
difficulty in respect of proof.  Part of the answer to these and related issues is to 
be found in the allocation of burdens of proof. 
In view of the various challenges that prosecution of public corruption 
including illicit enrichment cases pose and the challenges encountered in respect 
of proof, national jurisdictions may, theoretically, decide to use different 
techniques or approaches to ensure that actual offenders do not escape justice. 
One possible approach is, arguably, to employ a lesser standard of proof than 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.4 Theoretically this could be either 
‘preponderant degree of proof’ or a ‘clear and convincing degree of proof’.5 The 
                                                                                                            
Fight against Public Corruption: Identifying the Elements of the Offence under the 
Criminal Code of Ethiopia’ in this same volume of Mizan Law Review, pages 45-84. 
3 For details See International Council on Human Rights Policy (2010), ‘Integrating 
Human Rights in the Anti-Corruption Agenda: Challenges, Possibilities and 
Opportunities’, at 63; available at:< www.ichratorg/files/reports/58/131b_report.pdf>, 
(last visited on 12/08/ 2013); Benjamin B. Wagner & Leslie Gielow Jacobs (2008-
2009), ‘Retooling Law Enforcement to Investigate and Prosecute Entrenched 
Corruption: Key Criminal Procedure Reforms for Indonesia and Other Nations’, 30 U. 
Pa. J. Int'l L., at 215-237. 
4 Ndiva Kofele-Kale (2006), ‘Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and 
Interests in Combating Economic Crimes’, 40 Int’l Law, at 940; Guillermo Jorge 
(2007), ‘The Romanian Legal Framework on Illicit Enrichment’, at 15-16; Available 
at: <www.aats.americanbar.org/.../romania-illegal_enrichment_framework-2007>, 
(last visited on 12/06/ 2013).  
5 Ibid; Margaret K. Lewis (2012), ‘Presuming Innocence, or Corruption, in China’, 50 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L., at 302- 307; Kofele-Kale, (at 940),  writes as follows:  
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second option could be to ease or reduce the burden of the prosecutor by using 
legal techniques that involve presumptions of law, i.e., by embracing some form 
of reversal (easing) of burden of proof.   
However, such option (or resort to any other choice) is not put in place 
arbitrarily, or in violation of other fundamental values and due process rights 
such as the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the right to remain 
silent and the privilege against self-incrimination which modern democratic 
states observe, protect and enforce.6  This article deals with the second option 
(easing of the burden of the prosecutor) as it is this approach which is followed 
in the offence of illicit enrichment. We shall see to what element of the offence 
this reduction (relaxation) relates and what that means in practice. As a prelude 
to this discussion, the material and/or moral facts which the prosecutor should 
prove in illicit enrichment cases need to be identified, after which whether there 
is any fact the accused is required to prove or disprove can be examined.  
As is the case for other offences, the principle of presumption of innocence 
and other fundamental due process values in criminal justice require the 
prosecutor to bear both evidential and ultimate (persuasive) burdens of proof in 
illicit enrichment prosecutions. No accused person is required to prove his 
innocence in this era of modernity. Putting innocent persons in such a peril is 
not within the public interest and does not enhance the fight against public 
corruption. Even putting de facto criminals in such a skewed position is not 
                                                                                                            
  In illicit enrichment cases, the accused is likely to enjoy considerable advantages 
in terms of access to relevant information, which creates an imbalance to the 
detriment of the prosecution in breach of the equality-of-arms principle. 
Something needs to be done to compensate for this inequality of arms between the 
parties. Part of the solution lies in making some adjustments on how the burden of 
proof and the requisite standard of proof are allocated between the prosecution and 
the accused. The accused public official should be made to assume a significant 
burden in going forward with evidence [evidential burden] while allowing the state 
to be able to prove its case on the less stringent balance of probabilities standard. 
6 As mentioned elsewhere …, the U.S, Canada, England, South Africa and most other 
developed (western) countries out rightly rejected the idea of criminalization of illicit 
enrichment mainly because they think that such a measure would unduly interfere 
against the principle of presumption of innocence and other vital components of the 
right to fair trial. Babu noted that “the delegations of the Russian Federation, the 
Member States of the European Union and others had expressed their strong wish to 
delete [Art 20 of the UNCAC]” at the negotiating stage of the UNCAC. See R. Rajesh 
Babu (2006), ‘The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A Critical 
Overview’, at 14 (footnote 65), available at:  
  <http://ssrn.com/abstract=891898> (last visited 25 December 2013). It would be 
beyond the tolerable (acceptable) degree, if those national jurisdictions that recognize 
the offence of illicit enrichment, go further and embrace other approaches. 
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acceptable as it defeats the right to equality of arms and other components of the 
right to a fair trial. To obtain conviction, the prosecutor must therefore go 
forward with (lead) evidence and prove that the accused has committed the 
crime of illicit enrichment with a culpable state of mind. These burdens in turn 
require the prosecutor to establish at least some of the actus reus and/or mens 
rea elements of the offence (in addition to establishing those other constitutive 
elements).7 The prosecutor must prove at least the following four threshold 
factual elements:8  
a) that the accused is or has been a public official (servant) or any other 
‘person of interest’;  
b) that the accused public servant has acquired a certain total amount of 
income from lawful sources during a ‘period of check’; 
c) that the accused public servant possesses a ‘disproportionate asset’ 
and/or demonstrates a living style which is far in excess of his income 
from lawful earnings; and  
d) that the significant increase is made during the period of check- from the 
time the accused has been hired/assigned/appointed or elected to serve in 
public office or public undertaking. 
Apparently, the prosecutor should prove the public servant’s legitimate income. 
Yet, whether the prosecutor’s burden of proving such legitimate income of the 
accused is confined only to establishing legitimate income deriving from salary 
and related benefits or whether it extends to the establishment of other 
legitimate sources (such as income from inheritance, prize, or income from 
other private investment, etc.), is open to debate.  
Be that as it may, the prosecutor must establish the extent of money/asset 
under the control of the accused public servant. Further, the extent of money or 
other property which the accused acquired lawfully during the ‘period of check’ 
must be established. The prosecutor in addition needs to establish the 
discrepancy between the amounts of income derived from known legitimate 
sources and the one which is found under the control of the accused, or which is 
manifested in his living standards, during the period of interest. If the prosecutor 
succeeds to establish these basic elements to the required degree of proof, then it 
could be possible to theoretically and/or legally conceive of other techniques or 
approaches that may mitigate the stringency of the prosecutor’s evidential 
and/or persuasive burdens.  
                                           
7 Note that in ordinary crimes and in the normal course of things, the prosecutor is 
required to prove each and every ingredient of an offence in its charge.  
8 See Kofele-Kale, supra note 4, at 943 (including footnote 174). It appears that the 
mens rea is to be inferred from the proof of these elements. 
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As the formulation (definition) of the offence of illicit enrichment under the 
international/regional conventions and national laws shows, transfer (“shift” or 
“reversal”) of burden of “proof” from the prosecutor to the accused is made only 
in relation to the fifth element of the offence (‘absence of justification’). The 
nature of this “burden” and other related details are to be explained in the 
context of the operation of the form of presumption envisaged by the law.  We 
have to note that the accused is required only to shoulder some form of burden 
of “proof”, and this is only in respect of this element of the offence (i.e., 
‘absence of justification’). It is thus wrong to take this transfer (“shift”) as 
amounting to a total shift of burden of proof from the prosecutor to the accused 
in respect of every element of the offence. And this transfer of a form of burden 
of “proof” to the accused in respect of this one element of the offence does not 
in any way signify presumption of guilt. It is impossible to consider the transfer 
of burden in respect of this element before the prosecutor successfully proves 
the four threshold elements. 
Moreover, it must be underscored that such transfer of burden of “proof” in 
respect of ‘absence of justification’ element of the offence from the prosecutor 
to the accused is different from the one that occurs in case of tactical burden of 
proof in other criminal proceedings. This transfer of burden of “proof” comes in 
the middle of the proceeding as soon as the prosecutor establishes the four 
threshold elements but before it is required to establish the other essential 
element of the offence in the charge. For example, if an accused raises an 
affirmative defence such as legitimate defence, or duress, or lawful order in a 
given criminal charge brought against him, a tactical burden of proof transfers 
from the prosecutor to the accused only after the prosecutor has 
comprehensively established every element of the offence in the charge. In the 
case of illicit enrichment, however, the “shift” of burden of “proof” comes into 
the picture only after the prosecutor has established the four basic elements and 
before it is required to prove ‘absence of justification’ element of the offence. 
This is made possible by the operation of presumption of law. Again, the nature, 
form and legal consequence of this “shift” of burden of “proof” eventuated by 
the operation of presumption of law should be identified by critically examining 
the kind of presumption that is adopted in the criminal law provision that creates 
the offence. 
1.2  Burdens of Proof and the Operation of Presumption of law in 
Illicit Enrichment cases 
The definition (formulation) of the offence of illicit enrichment in national, 
regional and international legal instruments employs a form of presumption of 
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law.9 Such an employment of a presumption of law entails consequences upon 
the allocation of burdens of proof existing between prosecuting authorities and 
the accused. As can be gathered from the various definitions (formulations) of 
the offence of illicit enrichment, the embedded form of presumption pertains to 
the disproportionate assets of the accused person that is found under the 
possession of, or demonstrated in the life style of, the accused.  The specific 
nature of the presumption needs closer scrutiny.  
Theoretically, the formulation of presumptions in an offence of illicit 
enrichment case may take one of the following forms:10 
a) Irrebuttable or conclusive presumption: This requires the prosecutor to 
prove the extra (disproportionate) assets of the accused that exceed 
lawful incomes/earnings. If that is successfully discharged, it requires 
the court to conclusively presume the illicit origin or illegality of such 
additional assets.11 
b) Provisional presumption: This requires the prosecutor to prove the basic 
fact of assets out of proportion to lawful income. It further grants 
discretionary power to the courts to draw inference from those extra 
assets as originating from illicit sources.12 
                                           
9 See Art IX of the 1996 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC), Art 
20 of the 2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), Art 1(1) of 
the 2003 African Union Convention on Combating and Preventing Corruption. 
(AUCPCC). Also see Art 419 of the Criminal Code as well as statutory laws of other 
countries in Lindy Muzila, Michelle Morales, Marianne Mathias, and Tammar Berger 
(2012), On the Take: Criminalizing Illicit Enrichment to Fight Corruption; 
Washington, DC: World Bank. DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-9454-0. License: Creative 
Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0, at Appendix ‘A’; available at: 
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>  (last visited 15/8/2013), (hereinafter 
‘On the Take: Criminalizing Illicit Enrichment to Fight Corruption’. 
10 See Lewis, supra note 5, at 305-307; See also Dennis I. H. Dennis (2002), The Law of 
Evidence, 2nd ed., (Reprinted, 2004), at 420-421. Normally, if it were not for the 
legislative recognition of presumption of law, the prosecutor would have been 
required to prove both the disproportionate assets that exceed the lawful income of 
the accused and the illicit sources of those extra assets. 
11 In this case the accused would not have any chance to rebut. This would tantamount 
to punishing a public servant for being found possessing property that exceeds his 
lawful income as such, with no proof of any illicit gain. 
12 Here the court has the discretion to draw or not draw a factual presumption of illicit 
gain. If the court draws such a presumption, the accused, in order to avoid the risk of 
losing on one’s case, would be responsible to respond by adducing some form of 
evidence to rebut what has been presumed by the court. This refers to a situation of 
“shift” of a tactical or provisional burden of “proof” to the accused. 
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c) Evidential presumption: This requires the prosecutor to prove the basic 
fact of assets out of proportion to lawful income. It further requires 
courts to mandatorily draw thereof a rebuttable presumption about the 
illicit origin of the extra assets.13 
d) Persuasive presumption: This requires the prosecutor to prove the basic 
fact of assets out of proportion to lawful income. It further requires the 
accused to produce some evidence of legal sources and convince judges 
that the assets were indeed from legal sources with a further mandatory 
obligation on the court to draw about the illicit origin of such property 
unless the accused proves to the contrary.14 
While these are possible theoretical formulations and options, in practice it is 
necessary to specifically identify the particular form of presumption that is 
adopted by a particular legislative or judicial body. Failure to identify the kind 
of presumption adopted may not merely defeat the legislature’s intention but can 
also be a source of injustice. It is thus necessary to identify whether a 
conclusive, or provisional, or evidential, or persuasive form of presumption has 
been envisaged under the offence-creating criminal law provision and/or the 
constitutional values such as the presumption of innocence, with a view to 
checking if that stands valid.  
From the theoretical perspective, it is clear that the first formulation (i.e., 
conclusive presumption) conclusively assumes guilt. This stands in stark 
contrast to the presumption of innocence and many other fundamental values. 
As it creates an offence that is not susceptible for a contest otherwise it cannot 
be a tenable option in any modern country. The second formulation (provisional 
presumption) grants discretionary power to the courts to draw or not draw a 
presumption of illicit gain. From theoretical perspective this does not pose any 
problem. And, such a formulation is common in law-making. In the context of 
                                           
13 In this case, if the prosecutor proved the basic facts stated, the court must presume 
that the extra sources are from illicit origin. But, the accused can rebut this evidential 
presumption by adducing sufficient rebuttal evidence that raises the issue of whether 
the presumed fact (that the extra sources are from illicit origin) is true. The accused is 
not under duty to convince or persuade judges about the truthfulness of his side of 
story. It suffices if the accused succeeds in raising some doubt(s) as to the 
truthfulness of the conclusion drawn in respect of the presumed fact.  
14 In this case also, if the prosecution proves the basic facts stated, the court must 
presume that the extra sources are from illicit origin. But, the accused can rebut the 
presumption by adducing rebuttal (counter) evidence that convinces judges about the 
truthfulness of one’s side of story. It is not sufficient for the accused to adduce 
evidence that sparks some doubt(s) against the presumed fact. The accused here bears 
legal or persuasive burden of proof and the accepted standard of proof imposed on 
the accused in such instances is balance of probabilities.  
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criminalization of illicit enrichment, however, such an approach may be 
criticized for being inadequate to address the difficulty encountered by 
prosecuting authorities in proving corruption offences. Such presumption does 
not significantly contribute to the effective enforcement of the criminal law 
against corrupt public officials as it leaves wide room for courts to exercise or 
not to exercise their discretionary power.  
We are thus left with the other two formulations-evidential presumptions and 
persuasive presumptions. The question then will be: Which form of formulation 
(type of presumption of law) is adopted under the international and regional 
conventions and under the statutory laws of national jurisdictions dealing with 
the offence of illicit enrichment? To provide an answer for this question one has 
to refer to the relevant provisions of the UNCAC15 and the two regional 
conventions -the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC)16 and 
the AUCPCC17- as well as to the statutory formulations of the offence in 
individual national jurisdictions.18  
The formulations of these regional and international legal instruments do not 
explicitly tell us whether evidential or persuasive presumption is envisaged. Nor 
do statutory laws of national jurisdictions squarely tell us whether the one or the 
other is adopted. However, the UN Legislative Guide for the implementation of 
the UNCAC makes it evident that only evidential presumption that entails shift 
                                           
15 Article 20 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) provides: 
    “Subject to its constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each 
State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, illicit 
enrichment, that is, a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or 
she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income” [Emphasis 
added].  
16 Article IX of this Convention stipulates: 
    “Subject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each 
State Party that has not yet done so shall take the necessary measures to establish 
under its laws as an offense a significant increase in the assets of a government 
official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings during 
the performance of his functions” [Emphasis added].  
17 Article 8 (1) of the African Union Convention on Combating and Preventing 
Corruption (AUCPCC) reads:  
   “Subject to the provisions of their domestic law, State Parties undertake to adopt 
necessary measures to establish under their laws an offence of illicit enrichment” 
Article 1 (1) of the same runs as follows: “‘Illicit enrichment’ means the significant 
increase in the assets of a public official or any other person which he or she cannot 
reasonably explain in relation to his or her income” [Emphasis added]. 
18 See On the Take: Criminalizing Illicit Enrichment to Fight Corruption, supra note 9, 
at Appendix ‘A’. 
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of evidential burden is envisaged.19 The case law of many national jurisdictions 
also recognizes evidential presumption and this approach is widely supported by 
many scholars.20  
This has been the experience in Hong Kong (a jurisdiction well experienced 
in prosecuting public officials under this offence for more than forty years), 
India, Argentina, Egypt, Mozambique and many other countries that have 
criminalized illicit enrichment. As Professor Kofele-Kale observes, “extant 
jurisprudence reads reverse onus clauses as casting an evidential burden on the 
accused.”21 Lewis also notes that “[r]everse-onus illicit enrichment provisions 
only shift an evidentiary burden of production and do not relieve the prosecution 
of the ultimate burden of proving the defendant guilty of the crime charged.”22  
If the prosecutor successfully establishes the four threshold elements 
(highlighted earlier under Section 1.1.),  judges shall, as per the operation of the 
evidential presumption, presume that the disproportionate money/asset found 
                                           
19 The Legislative Guide provides (at 104) that the accused only bears evidential burden 
of proof, available at: 
<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/CoC_LegislativeGuide. pdf>; See also 
(2004), ‘The United Nations Handbook on ‘Practical Anti-Corruption Measures for 
Prosecutors and Investigators’, at 61, available at: 
<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/Handbook.pdf>. 
20 See Kofele-Kale, supra note 4, at 943; On the Take: Criminalizing Illicit Enrichment 
to Fight Corruption, supra note 9, at 24-25; 30-31; Bertrand de Speville (1997), 
‘Reversing the Onus of Proof: Is it Compatible with Respect for Human Rights’, 
paper presented to the 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference, available at: 
<http://8iacc.org/papers/despeville.html> (last visited on 21 November 2013), at 4-6; 
Nihal Jayawickrama, Jeremy Pope & Oliver Stolpe (2002), ‘Legal Provisions to 
Facilitate the gathering of evidence in Corruption Cases: Easing the Burden of 
Proof’, 2 Forum on Crime and Society, No.1, at 28-31; Jorge, supra note 4, at 60-61; 
Lewis, supra note 5, at 308 & 312; Lilian Y. Y. Ma (1991), ‘Corruption Offences in 
Hong Kong: Reverse Onus Clauses and the Bills of Rights, 21 Hong Kong L. J., at 
318; Pedro Gomes Pereira and João Carlos Trindade (2012), ‘Overview and Analysis 
of the Anti-Corruption Legislative Package of Mozambique-Legal analysis’,at 
33;available at  
   <http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/.../Mozambique_Legal_analysis.pdf> 
(last visited 22 December, 2013). 
21 Ibid. Nevertheless, Professor Kofele-Kale argues (supra note 4, at 942-943) in favor 
of imposing persuasive burden of proof in respect of the presumed fact if such 
prosecutions involve senior public officials. 
22 Lewis, supra note 5, at 312 (footnoted omitted).  As will be discussed, endorsement 
of evidential presumption has the effect of transferring or “shifting” evidential burden 
in respect of the fifth element of the crime of illicit enrichment (‘absence of 
justification’) to the accused. 
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under the direct or indirect possession of the accused public servant is a result of 
some illegal or illicit activity. The prosecutor is not required to prove any illegal 
transaction or activity (“predicate offence”) that could explain the background.23 
From the proof of the disproportionate money/assets or the lifestyle of the 
accused public official the court presumes the commission of some illicit or 
illegal activity in relation to the public servant’s position or service. In this 
regard, it has been noted: 
In illicit enrichment, the prosecution no longer is required to determine the 
unlawful origin of the assets. Instead, if they have proven that they cannot 
determine the legal origin of the assets, they can require the person under 
investigation to explain how this property derived from legal sources. There 
is thus no reversal of the burden of proof but an easing of the burden of 
proof on the prosecution: the prosecution does not have to demonstrate that 
the assets are criminal in nature, but it has to demonstrate that they cannot 
determine the legal origin of the assets.24 
In prosecuting this offence, the prosecution is made a beneficiary of the 
evidential presumption. Its burden of adduction of evidence in respect of one of 
the ingredients of the offence (absence of justification) is relaxed (eased) by the 
presumption. Such measure contributes to effective law enforcement against 
corrupt officials and better intensifies the fight against public corruption. It helps 
prosecuting authorities to overcome the difficulty they face in proving some 
forms of corruption crimes which often take place in secret. The following 
observation illustrates the point: 
The intent behind the offence of illicit enrichment is to allow the prosecution 
to prove corruption much more easily by removing any requirement to 
demonstrate a nexus between a benefit gained by an official and a particular 
governmental action rendered by the official in exchange for the benefit. A 
relaxation of the state’s burden is deemed necessary because proving that a 
public servant’s unexplained accumulated wealth is the product of 
corruption presents serious evidential problems for the state.25 
To some extent, such an approach interferes with the enjoyment of the right to 
be presumed innocent, right to remain silent and the right against self-
incrimination. However, the approach is accepted (in those countries that have 
criminalized illicit enrichment) as a legitimate, necessary, reasonable and 
proportional response in view of the multi-dimensional severe threats that public 
corruption has posed against public interest. At this juncture, one should note 
                                           
23 Jorge, supra note 4, at 16. 
24 See Pereira & Trindade , supra note 20, at 33.  
25 Kofele-Kale, supra note 4, at 912. 
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that this approach is not something unique envisaged only in the offence of 
illicit enrichment. With the proliferation of “acquisitive crimes” (crimes that 
generate profits such as money laundering, illicit drug market, corruption, 
trafficking in persons, arms, organs and migrants) traditional criminal law and 
enforcement theory has,  in recent times, entered into some paradigm shift 
across the globe.26 
As Professor Jorge notes “attacking criminal profits after they have been 
earned become a central objective of many criminal law systems.”27 Such a new 
approach increases the effectiveness of legal instruments to detect, seize and 
confiscate ill-gotten gains and reduces the motivation for engaging in such 
acquisitive criminal activities.28 Thus, one has to see the evidential presumption 
endorsed in the offence of illicit enrichment and the attendant transfer of 
evidential burden from the prosecutor to the accused from this vantage point. 
Yet, one may still doubt whether this approach of evidential presumption is 
compatible with the principle of presumption of innocence. While this can be 
debatable, the European Court of Human Rights in Salabiaku v. France and the 
Court of Appeals in Hong Kong in Attorney General v. Hui Kin Hong 
maintained that reversing evidential burdens of proof is compatible with the 
principle of presumption of innocence.29 Countries that criminalized illicit 
enrichment do not see incompatibility between the embedded evidential 
presumption and the principle of presumption of innocence.30   
Despite the evidential presumption taken against him, the accused has a 
chance to offer ‘reasonable explanation’ regarding the disproportionate 
money/assets that is established by the prosecutor. Apart from other grounds of 
                                           
26  For some details read Jorge, supra note 4, at 13-20. 
27 Id, at 14. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See On the Take: Criminalizing Illicit Enrichment to Fight Corruption, supra note 9, 
at 25; Maud Perdriel-Vaissiere (January 2012), ‘The Accumulation of Unexplained 
Wealth by Public Officials: Making the offence of illicit enrichment enforceable’, U4 
Brief, No 1, at 2-3, available at: <www.U4.no>, (last visited on 17/08/2013), at 2; de 
Speville, supra note 20, at 4-6;  Kofele-Kale observes the experience of the European 
Court of Human Rights in some other criminal offences and notes: “The European 
Court of Human Rights was one of the first international tribunals to argue in favour 
of treating reverse burden clauses as no more than reasonable limits on the 
presumption of innocence since they only place an evidential burden on the accused 
with respect to an element that would be otherwise difficult for the prosecution to 
prove given the defendant’s superior access to that information” [emphasis added] 
(Kofele-Kale, supra note 4, at 931). 
30 For the position of the U.S, Canada, South Africa and others one may again look at 
what has been briefly mentioned under footnote 6. 
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defense (e.g., alibi, false testimony, erroneous estimation, etc) which the 
accused may raise to discharge his tactical burden of proof, the accused in illicit 
enrichment prosecution is further allowed to rebut or counter the presumption 
drawn (by introducing evidence that shows the ‘otherwise origin’ of his money 
or assets).31 To this effect, the accused may introduce evidence of inheritance, 
prize, lawful gifts or donations, income from bonus, or income from overtime, 
or part-time work, or per diem, or from renting, or other agricultural, trading or 
investment activities, etc. Whether this “otherwise origin” is confined to only 
such and other lawful sources or can extend to include unrelated illegal or illicit 
sources (unrelated with one’s public position or service) is left open for judicial 
interpretation.  
The fourth formulation (persuasive presumption) requires the prosecution to 
prove the four threshold elements, after which the court must presume that the 
extra sources are from illicit origin unless the accused disproves this 
presumption. The accused can rebut the presumption by adducing rebuttal 
(counter) evidence that convinces judges about the truthfulness of his side of 
story. It is clear that such an approach endorses the reversal of persuasive 
burden of proof from the prosecutor to the accused. Nevertheless, this approach 
of persuasive presumption has never been accepted so far in international and 
national legal regimes as well as in judicial jurisprudence as it may lead to 
wrongful conviction of innocent individuals in the face of reasonable doubts.32  
This approach may annihilate one of the most universally accepted and 
cherished principles of criminal and criminal procedure laws i.e., the principle 
of presumption of innocence and jeopardize other components of the right to fair 
trial as well as the right to private ownership of property. Yet, some scholars 
such as Kofele-Kale support the adoption of this approach in cases where higher 
(senior) officials of a state such as “heads of state and government, senior 
government, judicial or military officials and senior executives of publicly-
owned corporations who, soon after their appointment or election to office 
suddenly become rich without their being any rational explanation to such 
accumulation of wealth” are charged for committing the offence of illicit 
                                           
31 The accused can contest the assessment of the prosecutor that is said to constitute 
disproportionate assets. It is open for the accused to attack the prosecutor’s 
establishment of preliminary facts based on ‘person of interest’, ‘period of check’, 
valuation of property, discrediting possession (ownership) of money or other property 
as his own, etc. If the prosecutor successfully discharges its evidential burden of 
proof on all the basic facts under its obligation, the accused is required to bear tactical 
burden of proof on these elements or other grounds of defense such as alibi defense. 
The accused is also required to bear evidential burden of proof on the fifth element of 
the offence, i.e., ‘absence of justification’. 
32 See the references under footnotes 19 & 20. 
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enrichment.33  Kofele-Kale, however, notes that the prevailing approach and the 
extant jurisprudence only envisages shift of evidential burden of proof 
eventuated by endorsement of evidential presumption.34 
2. Standards of Proof in Illicit Enrichment Prosecutions  
Standard of proof pertains to the assessment or evaluation of probative 
materials, mainly of evidence. In criminal proceedings the standard is measured 
differently at the various stages of the criminal process. For example, the 
amount or intensity of evidence that is required to issue an arrest warrant is 
different from that which is required to decide to prosecute or prepare a formal 
criminal charge. Therefore, the different forms of standards of proof in criminal 
proceedings include those degrees of “proof” utilized in pre-trial proceedings to 
assess if there exists: 
- ‘probable cause’- a prerequisite to issue summons or arrest warrant or 
search and seizure warrant;  
- ‘sufficient evidence’- a prerequisite to decide to prosecute (prepare a 
criminal charge); and, 
- the standard employed during trial proceedings such as ‘prima facie degree 
of proof’, ‘preponderance degree of proof’, ‘clear and convincing degree of 
proof’, and ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt degree of proof’.35  
Here we are interested in identifying the standards of proof that are applicable in 
trial proceedings involving illicit enrichment cases. The themes involved in this 
regard include the respective standards of proof borne by the prosecutor and the 
accused over the factual matters falling under their respective burdens of proof.  
In other words, the inquiry relates to the degrees of proof that are required of the 
                                           
33 Kofele-Kale (supra note 4, at 910 & 942-943). He (at 942-943) argues that “given the 
clandestine nature of official corruption, fairness and public policy demand that the 
burden of persuasion be placed on the accused. This should be the case given the 
accused public official’s superior resources, which place him in a considerably better 
position than the prosecution to determine whether or not statements regarding the 
origins of his wealth are true or false.[…] in exceptional cases where the essential 
elements of the facts at issue in the case are peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
accused, then the evidentiary burden, as well as the burden of persuasion, can 
arguably be borne by the accused.” 
34 Id, at 943. 
35 For further details See J. P. McBaine, ‘Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief’, 32 Cal. 
L. Rev. (1944), at 242-268. See also Christoph Engel (2008-2009), ‘Preponderance of 
the Evidence versus Intime Conviction: A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict 
between American and Continental European Law’, 33 Vt. L. Rev., at 435 ff; See the 
experience of some countries of the world from Craig M. Bradley (ed.) (2001), 
Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, 2nd ed.  
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prosecutor to discharge its evidential and ultimate burdens of proof, and it also 
deals with the  tactical and evidential burdens of proof borne by accused. 
The degree of “proof” borne by the prosecutor to successfully discharge the 
evidential burden on those threshold facts is not specifically stated in any of the 
relevant conventions or in any other national statutory law. The same is true 
with regard to an accused person’s tactical and/or evidential burdens of proof.  
Moreover, there is no particular mention of the standard of proof that is required 
of the prosecutor to discharge its persuasive (ultimate) burden of proof. In view 
of such state of affairs and in the face of the almost universally accepted 
principle of presumption of innocence, it is appropriate to follow the usual 
standards of proof that are applicable in other cases. In this regard, there is no 
difference between prosecutions involving illicit enrichment and prosecutions 
involving any other form of ordinary crimes. In effect, the prosecutor is required 
to establish the existence of all the threshold elements with a prima facie degree 
of proof, which in actuality has to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt degree of 
proof.  
Thus, judges cannot lawfully order an accused to enter into his defense and 
to bear an evidential burden in respect of the ‘absence of justification’ element 
of the offence before and until the prosecutor successfully discharges its case 
with this degree of proof.36 The commission of illicit enrichment by the accused 
must be demonstrated prior to and independent of the “explanation” of the 
accused.37 The satisfactory or reasonable explanation requirement contained in 
the definition or formulation of the offence in the conventions as well as in 
statutory laws of national jurisdictions comes into the picture only after the 
prosecutor has sufficiently demonstrated the existence of disproportionate 
(“above commensurate”) property or a lifestyle that demonstrates such a 
disproportionate wealth of the accused during the period of check. 
If the prosecutor establishes those basic facts with such degree of proof, 
courts are mandatorily required to presume the illegal or illicit source or 
acquisition of the disproportionate assets unless they are provided with an 
otherwise reasonable explanation by the accused. Here lies the other unique 
feature of the offence. Following the successful discharge of evidential burden 
by the prosecutor on the threshold facts, the court is required to instruct the 
accused to give a satisfactory or reasonable explanation of the sources of the 
disproportionate assets found in his possession or on how he came to lead such a 
                                           
36 Jorge, supra note 4, at 60-61. 
37 On the Take: Criminalizing Illicit Enrichment to Fight Corruption, supra note 9, at 
23. 
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standard of life that is above his commensurate official income or resource.38 
The presumption drawn by the court remains valid if the accused fails or cannot 
give reasonable or satisfactory explanation.  
As has already been mentioned, an accused who contests the validity of such 
presumption and who would like to avoid conviction has to lead evidence with a 
view to rebut or counter it. He can do that by introducing evidence which 
explains the source of the money/assets found under his control. This evokes 
various questions: To what extent should the accused show or demonstrate that 
the extra money or property found under his control is from other legitimate 
sources? What does providing ‘reasonable’ or ‘satisfactory’ explanation to the 
court mean? Does this mean that the accused can only ‘spark some doubt’ on the 
presumption drawn or on the basic facts that led into the drawing of such a 
presumption? Or, is the accused required to create or raise some ‘reasonable 
doubt’? Or, is he required to ‘prove to a preponderant degree of proof’ that the 
disproportionate asset is not a result of some illicit or illegal activity related to 
his position or service but is a result of some known legitimate sources (even 
unrelated illegitimate sources)? What would be the consequence if at the end of 
the trial, the judges remain at equipoise or at equilibrium regarding the assets 
found under the control of the accused?  
As discussed earlier, evidential burden of proof only imposes upon the 
accused the duty of creating or raising ‘reasonable doubt’. As the particular 
burden of “proof” borne by the accused in this case is one of evidential burden, 
it follows that the standard of proof borne by the accused is one of creating or 
raising reasonable doubt against the presumed fact or against the evidence of 
the prosecutor. The prosecution bears the ultimate burden of proof. It is the duty 
of the prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 
Thus, the accused succeeds if he creates some reasonable doubt against the 
presumed fact or against the evidence of the prosecutor. The employment of 
such expression as “reasonable explanation” or “satisfactory explanation” in the 
three conventions and in the statutory laws of national jurisdictions reinforces 
this assertion. The accused is required to give or offer “reasonable explanation” 
or “satisfactory explanation” about the disproportionate money or property 
found under his control. The accused is not required to prove something to the 
satisfaction of judges. He is not expected of convincing judges about the 
truthfulness of his side of story because such a requirement does not apply to 
                                           
38 Note how Art IX of IACAC, Art 20 of UNCAC, and Art 1 of AUCPCC define the 
offence as a significant increase in the assets of a public/government official (“or any 
other person” adds the AUCPCC) which [the accused] “cannot reasonably explain” 
in relation to his/her (lawful) income/earnings. 
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evidential burden but only relates to reversal of persuasive burden of proof.39 
We have seen hereinabove that the Legislative Guide for the implementation of 
the UNCAC expressly provides for the transfer of evidential burden and not of 
persuasive burden. We have also noted that the practice of national jurisdictions 
does not involve such transfer of persuasive burden of proof from the prosecutor 
to the accused.  
Therefore, the accused in illicit enrichment cases is not expected to prove the 
truthfulness of his side of story with a preponderant degree of proof. The 
accused would be the beneficiary of doubt if at the end of the trial judges remain 
at equipoise about the money or property that is found under his control. Judges 
would thus be able to pass a judgment of conviction if the prosecutor proves the 
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt degree of proof.   
3. Appraisal of the Ethiopian Legal Framework on Burdens 
and Standards of Proof in Illicit Enrichment 
3.1 General overview 
There is the need to examine whether the Ethiopian legal framework is different 
from the three conventions and from the laws of other national jurisdictions. To 
this end, we need to have a closer look at the general organization, design and 
operation of the Ethiopian criminal justice system in general. This is because 
issues of burden and standard of proof are influenced or determined by, inter 
alia, the organizational structure and other peculiar features of the legal system 
in question.40  
It is often claimed that the contemporary Ethiopian legal system in general is 
a result of the mix of the common law and civil law legal systems.41 The manner 
                                           
39 See Kofele-Kale, supra note 4, at 943. 
40 Structures of legal systems are affected by theories of dispute resolution such as 
adversarial or inquisitorial systems which in turn are reflections of the role of 
governments in dispute resolution. For further details see Ronald J. Allen (2012), 
‘Burdens of Proof’, at 2- 24; available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146184> 
(Visited on 2 December 2013). 
41 See Jacques Vanderlinden (1966-1967), ‘Civil Law and Common Law influences on 
the developing law of Ethiopia’, 16 Buff. L. Rev., at 250- 266. It is a widely known 
that from 1955 through 1965 Ethiopia has adopted six codified laws in addition to the 
Revised Constitution of 1955. These were: the 1957 Penal Code, the 1960 Civil 
Code, the 1960 Commercial Code, the 1960 Maritime Code, the 1961 Criminal 
Procedure Code and the 1965 Civil Procedure Code. Except for the Civil Procedure 
Code, which was drafted by an Ethiopian (Mr. Nirayo Esayas), the other codes were 
drafted by European legal experts. The Penal Code was drafted by Professor Jean 
Graven, a Swiss criminal lawyer; the Civil Code was drafted by Professor Rene 
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in which the mix (combination) has been made in the laws and how it was put 
into practice requires extensive specific studies. Yet, a closer scrutiny of the 
legal design in the relevant codes of Ethiopian law shows that the substantive 
law codes were very much influenced by the civil law (Romano-Germanic) 
legal traditions and systems while the adjective (procedural) codes were 
influenced by the common law traditions and systems.42 This is definitely true in 
the case of the 1957 Penal Code and the 1961 Criminal Procedure Code.43  
Although the Penal Code is replaced by the new Criminal Code in 2004, the 
latter has substantially retained the substance and style of its predecessor. Yet, 
the Criminal Code has come up with new and additional forms of crimes.44 One 
of the new crimes incorporated in this Code is the offence of Possession of 
Unexplained Property embodied under Art 419 of the Code.  
On the other hand, the Criminal Procedure Code (1961) is still in force 
despite its many flaws and lacunae which were mainly identified in the 
aftermath of its promulgation.45 This Code exhibits more of adversarial criminal 
procedure systems and styles. This is especially true in respect of pre-trial and 
trial procedural designs and operations. For instance, the Code endorses partisan 
form of criminal investigation. The charging and trial and presentation of 
evidence are designed in the fashion of adversarial systems. The gathering and 
                                                                                                            
David, a French Comparative lawyer, and the Commercial and Maritime codes were 
prepared by other French Professors, Professor Escarra and after his death by 
Professor Jauffret. The Criminal Procedure Code was initially drafted by Professor 
Jean Graven but his draft was substantially set aside and it was again prepared by Sir 
Charles Mathew, a British common lawyer. Sir Charles Mathew’s draft was highly 
influenced by the then Malayan Criminal Procedure Code, which had a pronounced 
common law flavour (See Vanderlinden, supra note 76, at 257; Stanley Z. Fisher 
(1969), Ethiopian Criminal Procedure: A sourcebook, at ix-xii). 
42 Ibid. 
43 To properly grasp how issues of burden and standard of proof are accommodated in 
possession of unexplained property cases, we need to first know how the system of 
criminal justice is structured and what roles and responsibilities are assigned to 
participants in the criminal process. These are primarily determined by the 
Constitution, and the substantive criminal and criminal procedure laws. Thus our 
assessment involves these and other relevant normative and institutional elements of 
the present criminal justice system. 
44 To a certain extent, this Code has been influenced by the values and principles that 
are incorporated in the Federal Democratic Republic Constitution of Ethiopia (1995), 
hereinafter the Constitution.  
45 See what Fisher noted in 1969 (supra note 41, at xi-xii). 
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collection of evidence is undertaken by law enforcement agencies, mainly the 
regular police.46  
Even if the Criminal Procedure Code is still in force, it has been 
complemented by various laws. Other than the regular police, there are some 
specialized bodies that undertake criminal investigation in certain specific forms 
of crimes such as the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. The 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions of each Regional State are also 
entrusted with the power of criminal investigation and prosecution of cases 
involving corruption.47 At present, Ethiopia essentially follows the system of 
mandatory prosecution.48 In ordinary criminal offences, the decision to 
prosecute or not to prosecute is made by the regular public prosecutor. In the 
case of corruption offences this power is granted to the respective Ethics and 
Anti-Corruption Commission bodies.49 The roles and responsibilities of courts 
in the pre-trial and charging phases of the criminal processes are somehow 
similar to what is found in common law legal systems.50  
At the trial phase, the Ethiopian criminal justice system is substantially 
similar to, and it follows, that of the common law- adversarial style of litigation. 
Litigating parties are responsible to select and adduce their respective evidence. 
                                           
46 See for example Arts 9, 22-37 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P. C). Also, see 
Art 7 of the Federal Police Commission Proclamation No. 313/2003, apart from 
Regional States laws that establish and grant powers to the Regional Police bodies.  
47 See, for example, Arts 6 (3), 7 (3) - (7), & 8 of the Revised Federal Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission Establishment Proclamation No. 433/2005 (hereinafter Proc 
No. 433/2005). 
48 See Art 40 Cr. P.C endorsing system of mandatory prosecution. But, see also Art 42 
(1) (d). In cases of corruption offences see Arts 7(4) & 9 of Proc No. 433/2005. The 
Criminal Justice Policy of the country which was adopted on 25 Yekatit 2003 (March 
4, 2011) seems to envisage, under 3.12 of Section Three, a system of non-mandatory 
(discretionary) prosecution to some extent. 
49 See, for example, Arts 7 (4) & 9 of Proc No. 433/2005. 
50 They do not actively participate in the gathering and collection of evidence; they do 
not participate in the determination of the preliminary assessment of the evidence to 
gauge if there is sufficient evidence that leads into prosecution by the prosecutor. 
Their participation is confined to the supervision, controlling and granting or denial 
or restriction of the employment of coercive measures by police and other specialized 
bodies such as in cases of arrest and detention, remand and bail, search and seizure 
(Art 19 of the Constitution, Arts 26, 32-34, 49-56, 59, 63-79 & 93 of the Cr. P. C). To 
some extent, they participate in the recordation and preservation of evidence- such as 
recording statements or confessions of suspected persons (Art 35 Cr. P.C), and 
recording and preserving of statements of suspected persons, testimony of witnesses 
in circumstances where preliminary inquiry is preferred to by the prosecuting 
authorities (Arts 80-92 Cr. P.C).  
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Parties are responsible for the presentation and examination of evidence and 
witnesses.51 Examination of witnesses is accomplished in three interrelated 
phases: namely, examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination, 
all of which are typical features of the common law adversarial systems. The 
roles and responsibilities of judges are somehow limited.52 Accused persons are 
guaranteed with the right to fair trial including the right to be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law, the right to counsel, the right to full access 
to any evidence presented against them and the right to examine witnesses 
testifying against them.53 All these are applicable to any accused person without 
discrimination as it is expressly provided that every person is entitled to equality 
and the equal protection of the law.54  
Generally the criminal process in Ethiopia starts with partisan investigation, 
with judges having no role in the collection and gathering of incriminatory and 
exculpatory evidence. Preliminary assessment of the sufficiency of evidence 
collected by investigative authorities and the decision to prosecute or not 
prosecute are entirely accomplished and determined by prosecuting authorities. 
Litigating parties have pronounced roles and responsibilities during the trial and 
presentation of evidence. The Ethiopian criminal process is thus closer to the 
common law adversarial systems. Professor Fisher has also noted that the 
Ethiopian system of criminal procedure is predominantly adversarial with some 
fragments of inquisitorial elements.55 Hence what has been discussed in the 
previous sections in respect of issues of burden and standard of proof in the 
context of common law adversarial systems generally hold true to the Ethiopian 
criminal justice system.  
                                           
51 Art 20 (4) of the Constitution; Arts 136 – 142 & 147 Cr. P. C.  
52 Apart from generally controlling/supervising the parties’ presentation and 
examination of  evidence and ruling on issues of admissibility of evidence as 
provided under Arts 137, 139 & 144-146, judges have some limited roles in the 
presentation and examination of evidence (Arts 136 (4) & 143 Cr. P. C). Unlike the 
typical common law systems, however, there are no juries; and, all judges, both at the 
federal and regional states levels, are legally trained, though their level of education 
may vary. 
53 The Constitution, ratified treaties and the Criminal Procedure Code provide for a 
number of due process guarantees to suspected and/or accused persons. See Arts 20 
(1)-(7), 22, & 23 of the Constitution; also, see Art 11 of the UDHR, Art 14 of the 
ICCPR and Art 7 of the African Charter as these are also binding laws in Ethiopia 
(Arts 9 (4) and 13(2) of the Constitution). 
54 Art 25 of the Constitution & Art 4 of the Criminal Code. 
55 Fisher, supra note 41, at xii. 
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3.2  The Legal Framework on Burdens of Proof in Possession of 
Unexplained Property Cases  
Whether Ethiopian law on possession of unexplained property envisages an 
approach different from the UNCAC, the AUCPCC and the statutory laws of 
other jurisdictions in respect of allocation of burdens of proof 56 requires close 
scrutiny of relevant laws such as the stipulations in the Ethiopian Constitution, 
the provisions of relevant international and regional human rights instruments, 
the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. Art 20(3) of the 
Constitution embodies the principle of the presumption of innocence. It reads: 
“During proceedings, accused persons have the right to be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law and not to be compelled to testify against 
themselves.”  Art 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
Art 14(2) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights  (ICCPR) 
and Art 7 (1) (b) of the African Charter have similar stipulations.  
One of the basic legal effects of the principle (right) of presumption of 
innocence is to impose evidential burden of proof upon prosecuting bodies. By 
virtue of this principle, the prosecutor in possession of unexplained property 
cases, as is true in all other criminal cases, is required to open its case and to 
lead evidence. Art 136 of the Criminal Procedure Code also partly provides: 
(1) After the plea of the accused has been entered, the public prosecutor shall 
open his case explaining shortly the charges he proposes to prove and the 
nature of the evidence he will lead. […] 
(2) The public prosecutor shall then call his witnesses and experts, if any. 
[….] 
Art 141 of the same Code provides: “When the case for the prosecution is 
concluded, the court, if it finds that no case against the accused has been made 
out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction, shall record an order of 
acquittal.” These provisions show that it is the prosecuting authorities that bear 
evidential burden of proof in all criminal cases including those involving 
corruption offences. Whether the prosecution of illicit enrichment envisages 
some distinctive approaches in this regard can be examined based on substantive 
criminal law.  
 
                                           
56 The author would like to emphasize the need to have clarity on the particular sense of 
“burden of proof”.  As there are varieties of senses in which this term could be 
employed (in the literature, in statutory laws, in speech), it is vital to try to identify in 
which sense this term is to be employed or has already been employed.  
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To this end, we can examine the allocation of evidential burden of proof 
under Art 419 of the Criminal Code.57  The constitutive elements of the offence 
under Art 419 of the Criminal Code are: ‘persons of interest’, ‘period of check’, 
‘existence of disproportionate assets’, ‘mens rea’, and ‘absence of justification’. 
Of these five essential ingredients of the offence, the prosecutor, is required to 
prove: 
a) that the accused is or has been a public servant (person of interest), 58 
b) the amount of salary the accused public servant has been paid during the 
period of check,  
c) that the accused had or has a disproportionate amount of money or 
property, or had a standard of life or is living a standard of life that is not 
commensurate with his official legitimate income (disproportionate 
assets); and  
d) the mens rea- an element which is to be inferred from the other proved 
factual facts.  
Prosecuting authorities bear evidential burden of proof on these facts; and the 
accused is not required to lead and prove or disprove with evidence any of these 
four elements of the offence. There is no single word or expression in the 
provision that warrants or implies any other interpretation.  What has been noted 
above in the context of the international and regional conventions and other 
national jurisdictions also holds true to Ethiopia. 
Following a successful discharge of the evidential burden by the prosecutor 
on those facts, the court would instruct the accused to give an explanation 
regarding the “disproportionate pecuniary resources or property” found in his 
possession or “how he was able to maintain such a standard of living” that is 
“above that which is commensurate with the official income from his present or 
                                           
57 Art 419 provides:  
(1) Any public servant, being or having been in a public office, who:  
a) maintains a standard of living above that which is commensurate with the 
official income from his present or past employment or other means; or 
b) is in control of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to the official 
income from his present or past employment or other means,  
    shall, unless he gives a satisfactory explanation to the Court as to how he was 
able to maintain such a standard of living or how such pecuniary resources or 
property came under his control, be punished, without prejudice to the 
confiscation of the property or the restitution to the third party, with simple 
imprisonment or fine, or in serious cases, with rigorous imprisonment not 
exceeding five years and fine. 
58 Also, read Art 419 cum Art 33 of the Criminal Code. The scope of ‘person of interest’ 
includes other non-public servants who may participate in the commission of this 
crime. 
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past employment or other means”. The court cannot order the accused to enter 
into his defence without a prior establishment of the four elements by the 
prosecutor to the standard of degree required. What is provided under Art 
419(1) goes in line with the constitutional principle of presumption of innocence 
as well as with that provided under Arts 141 & 142 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code. 
Once the prosecutor sufficiently establishes the four elements of the offence, 
it is not required to adduce (further) evidence that supports and establishes the 
lack of justification for the disproportionate money or other property found in 
the possession of the accused or for the manifestations in the lifestyle of the 
accused. Based on the proof of the four elements, Art 419 explicitly provides 
that the court shall draw a legal presumption that the accused has committed the 
offence of possession of unexplained property “unless he [the accused public 
servant] gives a satisfactory explanation to the Court as to how he was able to 
maintain such a standard of living or how such pecuniary resources or property 
came under his control”.  
This stipulation creates rebuttable presumption of law in favour of the 
prosecutor and against the accused. It is clear that it is the accused that is 
required to adduce evidence with a view to provide a satisfactory explanation of 
the sources of the disproportionate money or other property. This is therefore an 
instance where one observes the easing or transfer (“shift”) of the prosecutor’s 
evidential burden on an essential element of the offence, i.e. as to how the 
accused was able to maintain such a standard of living or how such pecuniary 
resources or property came under his control.  The court is required to draw a 
presumption about the commission of the offence only “unless the accused gives 
satisfactory explanation.” This is different from requiring courts to draw a 
presumption until and unless the accused proves/disproves an element of an 
offence. Art 419 does not thus envisage transfer (“shift”) or reversal of 
persuasive burden from the prosecutor to the accused.  
To avoid the risk of the mandatory presumption of law, the accused needs to 
lead evidence that shows the ‘otherwise origin’59of the money or property found 
                                           
59 Whether this ‘otherwise origin’ is only confined to legitimate sources or could 
include other illegitimate but unrelated sources appears to be open for debate on both 
sides. Yet, there is no qualification under Art 419 for it to be only from lawful or 
legitimate sources. The accused is only required to give satisfactory explanation as to 
“how he was able to maintain such a standard of living or how such pecuniary 
resources or property came under his control.” Apart from this ground of defense that 
is related to source of income, the accused may adduce evidence that may counter or 
rebut any of the four elements which might have been tentatively (provisionally) 
established by the prosecutor. For example, he may contest the fact relating to his 
status as a public servant, or the time of check, or the amount of official income, or 
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in his control or that which is manifested in his living standard. The accused is 
only required to give satisfactory explanation and the explanation is required in 
respect of “how he was able to maintain such a standard of living or how such 
pecuniary resources or property came under his control”.  Clearly, the accused is 
not required to prove any element of the offence or any other under Art 419 of 
the Criminal Code.60 There is a distinction between ‘giving an explanation about 
something’ and ‘proving something’. Yet it is to be noted that the explanation 
required from the accused has to be satisfactory. This requirement of 
“satisfactory” explanation implies the degree of “proof” (in its loose sense) 
required of the accused. If the accused fails to introduce evidence, or even if he 
adduces some if that fails to provide “satisfactory explanation” regarding “how 
he was able to maintain such a standard of living or how such pecuniary 
resources or property came under his control”, the court is required to convict 
the accused for committing the offence of possession of unexplained property.   
Some people assume that Art 419 of the Criminal Code shifts persuasive 
burden of proof from the prosecutor to the accused thereby violating 
presumption of innocence embodied in Art 20(3) of the Constitution. However, 
the discussion in Sections 1 and 2 above indicates that this assumption is not 
tenable. As mentioned elsewhere, Art 419 is an exact copy of Hong Kong’s 
provision dealing with the same offence. In Hong Kong and other jurisdictions 
including Argentina and India (jurisdictions where the idea of criminalization of 
illicit enrichment originated), similar provisions on illicit enrichment are being 
enforced, and they merely envisage the reversal of evidential burden without 
being incompatible with the principle of presumption of innocence. 
3.3  The Legal Framework on Standards of Proof in Possession of 
Unexplained Property Cases 
It is essential to be clear with respect to the various forms of standards of proof 
that surface in relation to:  
a) the (initial) evidential burden of proof of the prosecutor,  
b) the tactical (provisional) burden of an accused that may arise in the middle 
of the trial,  
                                                                                                            
the calculation made to show the disparity between official income and what is found 
under his control, or still he may contest the fact of owning/possessing or controlling, 
etc.  In this regard, the accused bears tactical burden of proof and is thus required, if 
he wants, to adduce some rebuttal evidence for mere denial or contest does not count 
as such. 
60 See also the Amharic version which goes in part as “የዚህ ዓይነቱ የኑሮ ደረጃ Eንዴት 
ሊኖረው Eንደቻለ ወይም ያለው ንብረት ወይም የገንዘብ ምንጭ በEጁ Eንዴት ሊገባ Eንደቻለ ለፍርድ 
ቤት ካላስረዳ በስተቀር......” Note the distinction between the Amharic terms “ማስረዳት” and 
“ማረጋገጥ”. 
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c) the evidential burden of an accused in respect of some elements (or an 
element) of an offence that may arise in the middle of the trial following the 
operation of an evidential presumption,  
d) the persuasive burden of an accused in respect of some or just an element of 
an offence that may arise in the middle of the trial following the operation of 
a persuasive presumption, if any, and  
e) the ultimate (persuasive) burden of proof of the prosecutor. 
The degree of “proof” borne by the prosecutor to successfully discharge its 
evidential burden on those four basic facts is not specifically stated in any of the 
conventions and under Art 419 of the Criminal Code.  Moreover, there is no 
particular mention of any special persuasive or ultimate burden borne by the 
prosecutor in such prosecutions.  
In view of such state of affairs and in the face of the constitutional principle 
of presumption of innocence,61 it is appropriate to follow the normal course of 
things as are determined by the constitutional principle of the presumption of 
innocence and the explicit stipulations of Arts 141 and 142 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code. Accordingly, the standard of proof which the prosecutor bears 
to discharge its evidential burden for the four basic elements of the offence of 
possession of unexplained property under Art 419 of the Criminal Code is the 
prima facie degree of proof, which in effect is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This author does not share the view of some people who regard Art 33 of the 
Revised Anti-Corruption Special Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation 
No. 434/2005 as one which envisages a lesser standard of proof in criminal 
cases involving corruption (possession of unexplained property included).62 
What this provision stipulates has to do with the determination of whether an 
accused person has benefited from an identified criminal conduct in a charge or 
it has to do with the determination of the amount of money [or other property] 
to be recovered from an accused charged of committing some identified offence 
of corruption.  
                                           
61 It is important to recall that one other legal consequence of the principle of 
presumption of innocence pertains to the evidential burden of the state (prosecutor). 
For a brief overview of the contemporary narrow and wider meanings of the principle 
of presumption of innocence and for attendant implications and legal consequences 
see Worku Yaze Wodage, ‘Presumption of Innocence and the Requirement of Proof 
Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Reflections on Meaning, Scope and their Place under 
Ethiopian Law’, at 116-118  in Wondwossen Demissie (Ed.) (2010), ‘Human Rights 
in Criminal Proceedings: Normative and Practical Aspects’,  Ethiopian Human 
Rights Law Series, Vol. III. 
62 See, for example, Simeneh Kiros Assefa (2012), ‘The Principle of Presumption of 
Innocence and its Challenges in the Ethiopian Criminal Process’, 6 (2) Mizan Law 
Review, at 292. 
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The provision reads: “The standard of proof required to determine any 
question arising as to whether a person has benefited from criminal conduct, or 
the amount to be recovered shall be that applicable in civil proceedings 
[emphasis added].”63 The legislature has, under Art 33, reduced the evidential 
burden borne by the prosecutor in respect of two elements- ‘getting of benefit 
from a criminal conduct’ and ‘amount of money/property to be recovered from’ 
the accused. Yet this provision does not reduce the degree of proof that is 
required to establish other elements of the actus reus and mens rea of a 
particular offence of corruption. The alleged criminal conduct and mens rea 
elements need to be established at the same threshold as is required in other 
crimes, of course subject to other more specific stipulations, if any. 
If the prosecutor successfully discharges its evidential burden by securing a 
prima facie degree of proof, the court orders the accused to enter into his 
defense (as per Art 142 of the Cr. P. C) and to give a satisfactory explanation 
regarding the disproportionate money or property proved to be under his control 
as per Art 419 of the Criminal Code. In such cases the accused bears tactical 
(provisional) burden in respect of the four basic elements that are tentatively 
established by the prosecutor, and evidential burden in respect of the fifth 
element of the offence of possession of unexplained property (giving 
satisfactory explanation “how he was able to maintain such a standard of living 
or how such pecuniary resources or property came under his control”). For the 
former burden of “proof”, it suffices if the accused produces evidence the 
intensity of which is sufficient to spark some doubt(s) against those elements 
established by the prosecutor.  
As has been elaborated, the accused is not required to disprove; the accused 
is not under duty to convince even to a preponderant degree about the 
truthfulness of his side of the story in respect of any or all of these four elements 
of the offence. By virtue of the operation of the principle of presumption of 
innocence, it is the prosecutor that is expected to convince judges beyond a 
reasonable doubt when the court (in respect of a similar fact situation) assesses 
the evidence submitted by the prosecutor against the evidence of the accused.  
With regard to the evidential burden of the accused in respect of the fifth 
element of the offence of possession of unexplained property he is not required 
to disprove or to prove - he is only required to give explanation.64 But the 
                                           
63 The Amharic equivalent goes: “Aንድ ሰው በሙስና የወንጀል ድርጊት ሳቢያ ጥቅም ያገኘ መሆኑን 
ወይም Aለመሆኑን ወይም ተመላሽ የሚሆነውን ገንዘብ መጠን መወሰንን Aስመልክቶ የሚነሱ ክርክሮችን 
ለማስረዳት [ለማረጋገጥ] የሚቀርበው የማስረጃ ደረጃ በፍትሐብሔር ክርክር ጊዜ Eንደሚቀርበው የማስረጃ 
ደረጃ ይሆናል::”  
64 As Ashworth observed in relation to evidential burden imposed on accused persons, 
“... the burden is much lighter than the onus of proving an issue on the balance of 
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explanation has to be satisfactory to the court. This could be only accomplished 
by introducing evidence. The adduced evidence must have the intensity to 
satisfy judges as to “how he was able to maintain such a standard of living or 
how such pecuniary resources or property came under his control.” He is 
expected to secure the inner conviction (belief) of judges to some extent 
(satisfactorily) though he is not under duty to persuade (convince) them about 
the truthfulness of his assertion in his explanation. As the specific form of 
presumption drawn against him is not one of persuasive presumption, he is not 
even required to convince judges to a preponderant degree (50%+1) of proof.65 
Unlike the situation in the case of the tactical burden of “proof”, where the 
evidence of the two opposing parties are to be compared and evaluated to know 
which side of the evidence is closer to the reality, in this case of evidential 
burden only the evidence of the accused is gauged (evaluated) in view of the 
presumption drawn. ‘Presumption of law’ is a legal stipulation, and thus cannot 
be measured in terms of its intensity in the mind of judges. As Kofele-Kale 
notes: 
 […] in truth, nothing tips the scale but evidence, and a presumption, being a 
legal rule or a legal conclusion, is not evidence. It may represent and spring 
from certain evidential facts and these facts may be put in the scale; but that 
is not putting in the presumption itself. It may in a sense, be called ‘an 
instrument of proof’ or something ‘in the nature of evidence,’ in that it 
determines from whom evidence shall come; or it may be called a substitute 
for evidence, in the sense that it counts at the outset for evidence enough to 
make a prima facie case; but it is not evidence in the true sense. It is not 
probative matter, which may be a basis of inference and weighed and 
compared with other matter of a probative nature (Footnote omitted).66 
Although the evidence of the accused in not gauged in comparison with any 
other evidence (for the prosecutor is not required to adduce any evidence in 
respect of the fifth element of the crime), it should still be measured in itself to 
check its intensity in the minds of judges. This is something subjective which 
judges internally feel.  If the intensity of the evidence of the accused is felt to be 
a satisfactory explanation, the accused is said to have met the required standard 
of “proof” envisaged under Art 419 of the Criminal Code.  
                                                                                                            
probabilities...” (See Andrew Ashworth (2006), ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of 
Innocence’, 10 Int’l J. Evidence & Proof, at 269). 
65 For details  and better clarity see this author’s note titled ‘Burdens of proof, 
Presumptions and Standards of Proof in Criminal Cases’ published  in this same 
volume of Mizan Law  Review. 
66 Kofele-Kale, supra note 4, at 921. 
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The true and proper sense of standard of proof in criminal trials, including in 
possession of unexplained property, comes at the end of the trial and 
presentation of evidence stage of the process when all the evidence of each party 
is assessed both individually (separately) and in combination (holistically). At 
this stage, the other third legal effect of the operation of the principle of 
presumption of innocence comes into the picture. As many scholars in the field 
explained and as the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations 
interpreted it in its General Comment 13, the principle of presumption of 
innocence imposes upon the public prosecutor an ultimate burden of proof that 
is met by a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.67 Thus the 
prosecutor is required to prove the guilt of the accused in possession of 
unexplained property to this degree of proof. In this author’s understanding, the 
degree of proof required to establish the guilt of an accused is not affected by 
Art 33 of Proclamation No 434/2005. As already stated, the question of 
determination of ‘obtaining/getting of benefit from a criminal conduct’ and the 
‘amount of money/property to be recovered from’ the accused are different from 
establishing the existence of the four basic elements of the offence of possession 
of unexplained property. Art 33 of Proclamation No 434/2005 and Art 419 of 
the Criminal Code are meant to give different answers for the different questions 
that arise in different contexts.68  
 
                                           
67 See, for example, Ashworth, supra note 64, at 243-251; P. J. Schwikkard (1998), 
‘The Presumption of Innocence: What is it?’, 11 S. Afr. J. Crim. Just., at 406; General 
Comment of the Human Rights Committee of the UN adopted in its 21st Session, 13 
May 1984, available at: <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf> (last visited 17 Dec. 
2013). 
68 Art 33 gives an answer to the following questions. (i) Has the accused got some 
benefit from the alleged crime of corruption in the charge? (ii) What is the amount of 
money or other property that the accused has to return? Unlike Art 33 of 
Proclamation No. 434/2005, Art 419 of the Criminal Code gives answers for the 
following four questions: (i) Is the accused a “public servant” as defined in the Code 
or is he a person who has associated with a public servant accused of committing an 
offence of possession of unexplained property? (ii) What is the amount of income 
this public servant obtained from present or past employment or from other source? 
(iii) Is the money or property found under the control of the public servant or which 
is manifested in his way of life above (disproportionate to) the income he earned 
from present or past employment or from other source? And, (iv) Did the public 
servant obtain this disproportionate income during the period of check? 
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4. Practice of Ethiopian Courts in handling Issues of 
Burden and Standard of Proof in Possession of 
Unexplained Property Cases 
Apart from the Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie case, there are many 
decided and still pending cases before the federal and some regional state 
courts.69  The brief assessment (made in this section) on the practice of courts in 
handling issues of burden and standard of proof arising in such prosecutions is 
limited to highlighting some cases decided by the Federal High Court at Addis 
Ababa, and a few others decided by the Hawasa City High Court, by the 
Appellate Division and Cassation Division of the SNNP Regional Supreme 
Court, and one case decided by the West Gojjam High Court of the Amhara 
National Regional State. Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie’s case offers a 
broad picture of the confusions and dilemmas arising in these areas. As the 
Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court adopted a binding 
interpretation of Art 419 in this case, we shall examine at some depth how the 
Cassation Division handled issues of burden and standard of proof in this case.  
4.1  FEACC v. Elethabet W/Gebriel et al 
In FEACC v. Elethabet W/Gebriel et al, the 4th count brought against the 5th 
defendant, Mulugeta Y. is relevant for our discussion.  Mulugeta Y., who has 
been a marketing manager since Sene 15, 1990 E.C. (22 June 1998 ) in the 
                                           
69 Some of these cases are listed and referred to in the author’s other work. The cases 
consulted now include: 1) Cases decided by the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court such as the Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie v. SNNP EACC 
(Cassation File No. 63014), Hankara Harqa v. SNNP EACC (Cassation File No. 
58514), Adem Abdu et al v. FEACC (Cassation File No. 57938), and Tarekegn Teklu 
et al v. SNNP EACC  (Cassation File No. 67411); 2) Cases decided by the Federal 
High Court at Addis Ababa such as the FEACC v. Yared Getaneh case (File No. 
106020), FEACC v. Abdulkerim Adem et al case (File No. 97668), FEACC v. Seyfe 
Desta et al (on 6th count against 2nd defendant, Ahmed Seid Ebrahim) case (File 
No.66210), and FEACC v. Elethabet W/Gebriel et al case (particularly the 4th count 
against 5th defendant, Mulugeta Yayeh) (File No. 62293) and FEACC v. Birhanu 
Hika Roba case (File No. 83936); 3) Cases decided by the Awassa City High Court 
of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State (SNNP Regional 
State) such as  the SNNP EACC v. Hankara Harqa & Hirpitu Hankamo case (File 
No.06693), SNNP EACC v. Tarekegn Teklu et al case (File No. 6646); 4) Cases 
decided by Supreme Court appellate Division of  SNNP Regional State SNNP EACC 
v. Hankara Harqa & Hirpitu Hankamo case (File No. 31614), SNNP EACC v. 
Tarekegn Teklu et al case (File No. 33970). See also the cases that were decided by 
different high courts in the Amhara Regional State (ANRS) such as the ANRS EACC 
v. Dagim Dessalegn case (West Gojjam High Court, File No. 41634). 
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Akaki Steels Factory, a government owned enterprise, was (apart from other 
accusations in other counts) accused of possessing unexplained money and 
many other properties. The prosecutor stated in its charge the amount of salary 
the accused was being paid until the time of charge and included the list of 
money and properties alleged to constitute the offence.70 It adduced various 
pieces of documentary evidence in support of its charge.71 The accused denied 
committing this and other offences. After examining the contents of these 
documents, the judges, in a majority vote, ordered the accused to enter into his 
defence. Accordingly, the accused first moved to give his statement in 
accordance with Art 142(3) and then produced five witnesses to show that: 
- Some of the immovable properties were constructed before the entry into 
force of the Criminal Code,  
- The estimation of the immovable properties submitted by the prosecutor is 
too exaggerated and is not congruent to labour cost and construction 
expenses during the period of construction; 
- Some of the money belonged to other individuals,  and  
- Other money and property listed in the charge were derived from legitimate 
sources such as inheritance, from saving of salary, bonus and other benefits, 
and income deriving from renting of house.72  
The Court proceeded to assess if the accused succeeded in rebutting the 
evidence of the prosecutor. It then held: ‘Because the prosecutor’s charge states 
the accumulation of unexplained property by the accused until 2000 E.C, the 
accused’s objection relating to the house (which he said has been constructed 
before the entry into force of the Criminal Code) is not acceptable’; ‘the 
testimony of the defence witnesses in respect of income from inheritance and 
house rent is not sufficiently credible to rebut prosecution evidence’, and the 
‘extent of income derived from bonus and other benefits is not supported with 
evidence’. It further held: ‘even though there is some documentary evidence 
which proves that some of the money deposited in various banks belonged to 
other persons, these alone could not sufficiently prove the legitimate sources of 
all the money and properties found under the control of the accused’. 
Accordingly the court convicted the accused under Arts 438(1)(b) of the 
                                           
70 The list went from No. 1 through No. 9. 
71 These included documents that were alleged to establish ownership of residential 
buildings (house certificates) and estimations thereof, documents that testify 
defendant’s membership to various cooperatives established with a view to secure 
vacant lands for housing constructions, documents that establish amount of money 
deposited in saving accounts in different banks, and other documents that establish 
lease transaction. 
72 He has further introduced some documentary evidence to show that some of the 
moneys belonged to other persons. 
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previous Penal Code and under Art 419(1)(a) & (b) of the Criminal Code, and 
imposed three years rigorous imprisonment and a penalty of Birr 2,000. The 
court also ordered the confiscation of the money (subject to some reduction) and 
other properties listed in the charge.73  
The accused appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. After assessing the 
appellant’s arguments, and the response of the prosecutor, the Supreme Court 
partly quashed and partly confirmed the judgment and decision of the High 
Court.74 The Appellate Court noted that no shift of burden of proof could take 
place under Art 419 before the prosecutor establishes its case as it asserted in its 
charge. It reads:  
...የወንጀል ሕግ Aንቀጽ 419 (1) ምንጩ ያልታወቀ ንብረትና ገንዘብ የሚለውን በፊደል ተራ “ሀ” 
Eና “ለ” ላይ ከዘረዘረ በኋላ በፊደል “ለ” [...] ስለተከሳሹ የማስረዳት ሸክም የሚገልጽ ሆኖ ቢገኝም 
ይህ ማለት ከሳሽ የሚሆነው Aካል ይህንን የሕግ Aንቀጽ ጠቅሶ በተከሳሹ ላይ የወንጀል ክስ 
ማቅረቡ ብቻ በክሱ ላይ የተገለጸው ንብረት ወይም ገንዘብ ምንጭ የታወቀና ከሕጋዊ ገቢው የተገኘ 
ስለመሆኑ የማስረዳት ሸክም ወዲያውኑ ወደተከሳሹ ይዛወራል የሚል ትርጉም የሚሰጠው 
Aይደለም፡፡ ከሳሽ የሆነው Aካል በሌሎች የወንጀል ጉዳዮች በቅድሚያ Eንደ ክሱ Aገላለጽና 
Aቀራረብ የማስረዳት ሸክም Eንዳለበት ሁሉ በEንዲህ ዓይነቱ የወንጀል ክስና ክርክርም የተከሳሹ 
የኑሮ ደረጃ ከሕጋዊ ገቢው የበለጠ ስለመሆኑ ወይም ያለው ንብረት ወይም የገንዘብ ምንጭ 
ከሚያገኘው ወይም ሲያገኝ ከነበረው ሕጋዊ ገቢ ጋር የማይመጣጠን መሆኑን ማስረዳት 
ይጠበቅበታል፡፡ የማስረዳት ሸክሙ ወደተከሳሽ የሚዛወረው ከሳሽ ባቀረበው ማስረጃ ያስረዳበት 
ሆኖ ሲገኝ ነው፡፡ በወንጀል ሕግ Aንቀጽ 419 (1) መሠረት የሚቀርብ ክስ ከዚህ የሥነ-ሥርዓት 
Aካሄድ ውጭ ሊሆን Aይችልም፡፡ 
                                           
73 These included a house that is proved to be (i) built and completed until 1984 E.C, (ii) 
a vacant land which the accused obtained as one member to a cooperative that was 
established in 1996 E.C, (iii) another vacant land which the accused secured in a 
contract of lease from the City Administration, and (iv) money which other persons 
sent to the accused for other lawful purposes. 
74 On the basis of the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law, it quashed the 
judgement that pertained to the house built before the promulgation of the Criminal 
Code. It also revoked the judgement that included confiscation of vacant land 
(wherein no construction work was undertaken yet). The Court noted that the 
Prosecutor did not produce any evidence that proved the accomplishment of any 
construction work over the plot of land. It has also modified the judgment relating to 
the amount of money found deposited in the name of the accused by subtracting that 
amount which belonged to his brother (which the latter sent from Jimma). The Court 
also decided that the amount of money which this appellant deposited until 1996 E.C 
in closed account with a view to secure residential plots of land in three different 
cooperatives should not be confiscated. Furthermore, this Court revoked the decision 
relating to a vacant land which it said the appellant obtained from the City 
Administration with a contract of lease. It affirmed the judgment and decision of the 
High Court relating to other money and the buildings that are still underway and 
which the accused obtained as a member in the three cooperatives. 
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The High Court has properly stated that charging of an accused under Art 
419(1) of the Criminal Code does not entail transfer of burden of proof from the 
prosecutor to the accused. However, the High Court did not identify the facts 
that should have been established by, and the extent of proof required of, the 
prosecutor. It also did not consider the operation of the presumption embodied 
under Art 419 (1) and did not identify the burden of “proof” borne by the 
accused and the extent of “proof” thereof. This Court did not attempt to assess 
the issues in the case from the perspective of the principle of presumption of 
innocence. Nor did it sort out the respective burdens and standards of proof 
required of each party.  It merely focused on whether the oral and documentary 
evidence produced by the accused are sufficiently credible to rebut the evidence 
of the prosecutor.  
The Appellate Court, on the other hand, tried to specifically determine if the 
prosecutor succeeded in discharging its burden of proof, though it did not point 
out the nature of burdens and standards of proof borne by the prosecutor both at 
the initial and at the ultimate stages of the presentation of evidence.75 Again, this 
Court did not state how the presumption contained under Art 419(1) enters into 
operation and how evidential burden (as distinct from tactical burden of proof) 
transfers from the prosecutor to the accused. It did not expressly state that it was 
the prosecutor that shouldered evidential and legal burden to establish the actual 
amount of salary, bonus and other related benefits which the accused used to 
receive until the time of charge and to prove that what was found under the 
control of the accused was above those identified lawful sources of income. 
 
                                           
75 This Court has rightly identified that ‘period of check’ is one of the crucial points in 
this offence. It has rightly applied the principle of non-retroactive application of the 
criminal law to the house that was built before the promulgation of the Criminal 
Code. But, it has wrongly maintained that it is the burden of the appellant to prove 
that the money paid to the partial construction of the other three buildings was before 
the entry into force of the Criminal Code. It said: “Eነዚህ ሦስት የቤት ሥራ ማኅበሮች 
የተደራጁትና በቅድሚያ በዝግ የባንክ ሂሳብ የሚቀመጠው ገንዘብ የተያዘው በ19[9]6 ሆኖ ቢገኝም ይግባኝ ባይ 
ለሦስቱ ጅምር ቤቶች ማሠሪያ ከፍያለሁ ወይም Aውጥቻለሁ የሚለው ገንዘብ የወንጀል ሕጉ ከመውጣቱ በፊት 
ስለመሆኑ ካለመገለጹም በተጨማሪ ያቀረበው ማስረጃ የለም፡፡” It seems that the Court has 
appreciated the issue of ‘disproportionate assets’ as a vital constitutive element of the 
offence, though there are some flaws in trying to fix the burden of the prosecutor in 
that regard. It seems that it has, to some extent, appreciated the burden which the 
accused shouldered in respect of some of the money found deposited in his name in 
the different banks, though it did not appreciate that the accused was only required to 
“give satisfactory explanation”- it said “የሌላ ሰው ገንዘብ ነው፤ የEኔ Aይደለም የሚለውን 
የማስረዳት ሸክም ያለበት ይግባኝ ባይ ነው፡፡” 
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4.2  FEACC v. Yared Getaneh, ANRS EACC v. Dagim Dessalegn 
and other cases 
The accused, who was a public servant (and later on a First Instance Court judge 
at Addis Ababa, but a lawyer at the time of charge), was accused of 
accumulating unexplained money and other properties from Sene 18, 1993 E.C 
through Sene 9, 2002 E.C. (25 June 2001 to 16 June 2010). The amount of 
money and the value of other properties was generally estimated to reach Birr 
1,399,377.35. The prosecutor listed and adduced a number of documentary 
evidence to prove this accusation. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed 
that he can produce evidence to show the lawful origin of all the money and 
property alleged to have been found under his control. The High Court 
immediately ordered the accused to enter into his defence on this count. The 
accused produced four defence witnesses and some documentary evidence. 
Although the accused claimed that he earned Birr 266,000 as a lawyer fee in 
2003 E.C and produced documentary evidence to that effect, the Court held it 
‘not credible’ stating that this declaration of income to the tax authority was 
made after the institution of the charge. The court also maintained that the 
testimony of the three witnesses was not credible. Finally, it convicted the 
accused and imposed punishment.  
As this judgment stands to demonstrate, the Court in this case did not attempt 
to specifically indicate the particular burdens and standards of proof borne by 
each party. It ordered the accused to enter into his defence without first checking 
if the prosecutor has successfully discharged its evidential burden. It did not try 
to analyse issues from the perspective of the principle of presumption of 
innocence; it did not say anything in respect of the requirement of giving of 
‘satisfactory explanation’ provided under Art 419 of the Criminal Code. With 
due respect, the Court did not even consider that the ‘period of check’ was only 
between Ginbot 1, 1997 (9 May 2005) and the date of charge.  
The same holds true for the decision of West Gojjam High Court in the 
Amhara Regional State in the ANRS EACC v. Dagim Dessalegn case. The 
accused was prosecuted for possessing an amount of money and property totally 
worth of birr 721,191.35 while working in various public institutions from 1983 
through 2002 E.C. In this case, the court did not notice the ‘period of check’ and 
did not attempt to sort out if the money and other properties were accumulated 
since the entry into force of the Criminal Code. Its assessment rather went back 
to 1983 E.C. The Court did not say anything regarding the principle of 
presumption of innocence, the particular burdens and standards of proof and the 
operation of the presumption. It did not consider the case in light of the 
requirement of giving of ‘satisfactory explanation’ under Art 419 of the 
Criminal Code. Yet it has rightly tried to figure out some of the legitimate 
sources which the accused might have earned from salary and part-time work. 
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There are other cases that show contradictory holdings among the different 
levels of courts on similar issues and similar evidence. Accused persons who 
were acquitted by lower courts have been convicted by Appellate and/or 
Cassation courts. The main cause of such reversals and inconsistencies is 
attributable to the variation in the standards of proof employed. For instance, in 
SNNP EACC v. Hankara H. & Hiripato H.76 and in  SNNP EACC v. Tarekegn T. 
et al,77 the High Court acquitted the accused persons in the two separate files. In 
both cases, the SNNP EACC appealed to the Regional Supreme Court. The 
Appellate Court reversed the decisions of the lower court and passed conviction 
on all the respondents.78 It also imposed punishment and ordered for the 
                                           
76 Hankara, who was a public servant from 1985 E.C through Ginbot 30, 2000 E.C and 
whose earning from salary during this time was assessed to be not more than Birr 
52,958, and his wife Hiripato H., alleged to be unemployed house wife, were accused 
of  accumulating money and property estimated to reach  to Birr 4,159,497.80. The 
two accused pleaded not guilty. After examining the various documentary evidence 
of the prosecutor the High Court ordered the accused to enter their defence. 
Accordingly, they produced documentary and oral evidence to establish that a 
substantial amount of the money belonged to other persons (loan from individuals 
and  church money) and that the other are derived from different agricultural 
activities such as sale of chat, enset, eucalyptus tree, coffee, and maize.  After 
assessing the evidence in the case the High Court acquitted the accused saying that 
the accused have rebutted the evidence of the prosecutor.  
77 Tarekegn T., who was a public servant from Sene 10, 1996 E.C through Megabit 30, 
2000 E.C and whose earning from salary was assessed not to exceed Birr 70, 000, his 
wife, alleged to be unemployed house-wife (2nd accused) and, his brother-in-law, 
alleged to be a student, an unemployed one (3rd accused), were accused of 
accumulating money and properties estimated to reach to Birr 3,602,262.84.  The 
three accused pleaded not guilty. After examining the various documentary evidence 
of the prosecutor the High Court ordered the accused to enter their defence. 
Accordingly, they produced documentary and oral evidence to establish that most of 
the money and properties included in the charge were bought and/constructed before 
the promulgation of the Criminal Code at lesser price and that the remaining money 
was one which the 2rd accused received (through bank transfer and through other 
persons) lawfully from her brother living outside of Ethiopia and one which was 
obtained from agricultural activities. After assessing the evidence in the case, the 
High Court acquitted the accused stating that the accused have rebutted the evidence 
of the prosecutor. The court ascertained that most of the immovable properties were 
bought and/or constructed before 1997 E.C and their estimated price is less than that 
has been expressed in the charge. It also expressed that it ascertained that accused 
had other lawful means of income. 
78 The lawyer for Hankara & Hiripato argued before the Appellate Court, “...Aዲሱ 
የወንጀል ሕግ ከሌሎች ሕጎች የተለየ Aዲስ ነገር Aልፈጠረም፡፡ … የማስረዳት ሸክሙ ወደ መልስ ሰጭዎች 
መዛወሩ የማስረዳት ደረጃ ጭምር የሚያዛውር Aይደለም፡፡ መልስ ሰጭዎች ከጥርጣሬ በፀዳ መልኩ ማስረዳት 
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confiscation of the moneys and other properties found under the control of each 
accused.79  
In both cases, the accused persons, petitioned to the Cassation Division of the 
Regional Supreme Court but their petitions were not accepted. Finally, they 
petitioned to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court which 
confirmed the decisions of the Regional Supreme Court.80  
4.3  The Binding Interpretation adopted in the Workineh Kenbato 
& Amelework Dalie Case 
The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has rendered a binding 
interpretation in the Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie case. The propriety 
of its interpretation needs to be critically investigated in the light of fundamental 
constitutional values and principles such as the principle of presumption of 
innocence, right to liberty, and the right to private property. It must also be 
assessed based on the perspectives of what the legislature has expressly 
stipulated under Art 419 of the Criminal Code, and in the light of the UN 
Legislative Guide and the experience (and judicial jurisprudence) of other 
jurisdictions. 
4.3.1 Synopsis of the Case 
In Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie, the prosecutor (i.e. the SNNP 
EACC), charged Ato Workneh (1st Accused) and his wife, W/ro Amelework (2nd 
Accused) alleging that they were found possessing of unexplained property in 
violation of Art 419 (1) of the Criminal Code. In the particulars of the charge 
filed at the Hawasa City High Court of the SNNP Regional State, the prosecutor 
stated that Workineh was a public servant from Meskerem 1984 E.C (September 
1991) until the time of the charge.  According to the charge the amount of salary 
paid to Workineh during this period was a total of Birr 90,220 while his wife 
remained an unemployed house-wife. The charge stated that the two defendants 
were found possessing a total asset of Birr 2,081,468 and 90 cents81.  
                                                                                                            
Aይጠበቅባቸውም፤ ሚዛን በሚደፋ መልክ ማስረዳት ለመልስ ሰጭዎች በቂ ነው፡፡” The Appellate Court 
convicted all the accused in these two cases stating that the evidence of the accused is 
not sufficient to rebut the evidence of the prosecutor. 
79 In the second case it partly confirmed the decision of the lower court and excluded 
some moneys  and properties from the order of confiscation. 
80 See the files cited under footnote 69. 
81 The details of the Charge describes that the two accused deposited Birr 332,363.63 at 
Dashen Bank in the name of 2nd Accused; Birr 1,646,371.24 at Dashen Bank and Birr 
46,802.11 at the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia in the name of 1st Accused; and have 
a residential house which is estimated to worth Birr 55,931.92 in the name of their 
son. 
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The accused persons pleaded not guilty, and the prosecutor adduced 
documentary evidence82 to prove the commission of the offence. After 
examining the contents of the various pieces of documentary evidence, the High 
Court ordered the accused to enter into their defence. Accordingly, the two 
accused introduced oral and documentary evidence. In their defence, they 
alleged having other legitimate sources of income (from cultivation of chat, 
coffee, enset and sugar-cane). They further argued that Birr 1,120,500 belonged 
to two private limited companies, i.e., Gararamu Lanito Animal Husbandry PLC 
and Galma Cultural Lodge PLC. Moreover, they claimed that that amount 
deposited in the name of 1st defendant at Dashen Bank was obtained as loan 
from an individual person; they said that this money was initially deposited in 
the name of the 2nd defendant, but later on transferred to 1st accused for another 
legitimate purpose. Submitting all these grounds of defence and oral and 
documentary evidence83 they prayed for acquittal. After having examined the 
evidence on both sides, the High Court acquitted the two defendants stating that 
they have successfully rebutted the evidence of the prosecution.  
The Prosecutor appealed to the Regional State Supreme Court which 
confirmed the decision of the High Court after hearing additional witnesses. The 
prosecutor took its petition to the Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme 
Court alleging that the two courts committed fundamental error of law. The 
Cassation Division of the Regional Supreme Court found that the evidence 
submitted by the accused persons lacked cogency and credibility to rebut the 
evidence of the prosecutor. It found both defendants guilty of possession of 
unexplained property and imposed rigorous imprisonment of three years and one 
year against the 1st and 2nd defendants84 respectively. It further ordered for the 
confiscation of their money (deposited at the two banks) and the house 
mentioned in the charge. 
Aggrieved with this decision, the defendants petitioned to the Cassation 
Division of the Federal Supreme Court requesting that the Division quash the 
                                           
82 These are documents purported to establish/prove (i) the amount of salary paid to 1st 
accused since Meskerem 1984 E.C until the time of charge, (ii) that 2nd accused 
remained unemployed house-wife, (iii) amount of money deposited in 1st accused’s 
name in the Commericial Bank of Ethiopia and in Dashen Bank, (iv) amount of 
money deposited in 2nd accused’s name in Dashen Bank, and (v) the two accused 
have a residential house in the name of their son, Desta Workineh. 
83Apart from adducing the documents written by the Kebele Administration and the 
Zonal Agriculture Office regarding the income they alleged to have collected from 
two agricultural sites, they have introduced the minutes of the two private limited 
companies that state about the 1,120,5000 birr  deposited in the name of 1st accused. 
Also, some shareholders of these two companies have testified before the court. 
84 The Division ordered that the 1 year rigorous imprisonment remain in suspension. 
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judgment rendered against them. The prosecutor, on its part, argued otherwise 
and prayed for confirmation.  
4.3.2 The Holding of the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court  
After an extensive and thorough review of the case, the Cassation Division of 
the Federal Supreme Court found that the Cassation Division of the SNNP 
Regional State Supreme Court committed fundamental error of law. It observed 
that the Cassation Division of the Regional State Supreme Court does not have 
power to review errors of fact as well as to review the assessment of evidence 
conducted by the lower courts. It revoked both the conviction and the sanctions 
imposed on the accused. The FSC Cassation Division found that the High Court 
and the Regional Supreme Court committed fundamental error of law because 
they failed to frame the right issues and to order the accused persons carry out 
their respective burden of proof as per the requirement of Art 419 (1) of the 
Criminal Code.85  
The FSC Cassation Division stated that it is not sufficient for the accused to 
merely produce evidence that raises some doubts against the evidence of the 
prosecution. It maintained that the accused persons bear the burden of 
establishing or proving the source of the extra money and other property found 
in their name in a manner that ascertains the legitimate source of each money 
and property.86 The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court quashed 
the decision of the Cassation Division of the SNNP Regional State Supreme 
Court and remanded the case for re-trial by the High Court providing detailed 
                                           
85 The decision reads: “…የሥር ፍርድ ቤትና ይግባኝ ሰሚው ችሎት Aመልካቾች ያቀቧቸው ማስረጃዎች 
Aንደኛ Aመልካች ከሚሠራው የመንግሥት ሥራ በተጨማሪ ሌላ የገቢ ምንጭ የነበረው መሆኑን የሚያሳዩ 
ማስረጃዎች መሆናቸውን በመመልከት መጣራት የሚገባቸው ፍሬ ጉዳዮችን ሳያጣሩና በተለይም Aመልካቾች 
በAቃቤ ሕግ ክስና ማስረጃ ከሕጋዊ ገቢያቸው በላይ የያዙ መሆናቸውን ብር 2,081,468.90 ያገኙበትን ትክክለኛ 
የገቢ ምንጭ የወንጀል ሕጉ Aንቀጽ 419 ንUስ Aንቀጽ 1 በሚደነግገው መሠረት የማስረዳት ግዴታቸውን 
ተወጥተዋል ወይስ Aልተወጡም የሚለውን ጭብጥ በመያዝ በሕጉ በAመልካቾች ላይ የተጣለውን የማስረዳት 
ግዴታ/burden of proof/ መሠረት በማድረግ ተገቢውን ማጣራት Aድርገው መርምረውና መዝነው ውሳኔ 
የሰጡ Aለመሆናቸውን ከውሳኔያቸው ይዘት ለመረዳት ችለናል፡፡” 
86 The Cassation Division framed this issue reads “Aመልካቾች (በመንግሥት ሠራተኛነት ለ1ኛ 
ተከሳሽ ይከፈለው ከነበረው በላይ)… በባንክ ሂሳብ ቁጥራቸው የተገኘው ጥሬ ገንዘብና በልጃቸው ስም ቤት 
የሠሩበት ሀብት ማለትም ብር 2,081,468.90 ትክክለኛ ምንጭ የማስረዳት ግዴታና ኃላፊነት Aለባቸው ወይስ 
የAቃቤ ሕግን ክስና ማስረጃ ሊያስተባብሉ የሚችሉ Aንዳንድ ፍሬ ጉዳዮችን ለፍርድ ቤት ማቅረባቸው በቂ 
ይሆናል ወይስ Aይሆንም ?”  
       Then it reasoned and concluded as follows: “…Aቃቤ ሕግ በግልጽ ከሚታወቀው ሕጋዊ ገቢ 
በላይ ነው በማለት በክሱ የገለጸውንና በማስረጃ ያረጋገጠውን ሀብት ትክክለኛ ምንጭ የማስረዳት ግዴታ 
/burden of proof/ በተከሳሾች ላይ የሚወድቅ መሆኑን ነው፡፡ የተከሳሾች የማስረዳት ግዴታም Aቃቤ ሕግ 
በክሱ ከገለጸውና በማስረጃ ከረጋገጠው ውጭ ተከሳሾች ሌላ ገቢ የሚያገኙበት ሥራ ወይም የገቢ ምንጭ 
ያላቸው መሆኑን ብቻ ለፍርድ ቤቱ በማሳየት የሚወሰን ሳይሆን በAቃቤ ሕግ ክስና ማስረጃ ከተረጋገጠው ገቢ 
ውጭ በEጅ Eንደተገኘ የተረጋገጠው ገንዘብና ሀብት ትክክለኛ ምንጭ ምን Eንደሆነ የማስረዳት ግዴታና 
ኃላፊነት ያለበት መሆኑን ከወንጀል ሕግ Aንቀጽ 419 ንUስ Aንቀጽ 1 ሦስተኛው ፓራግራፍ ድንጋጌ Aቀራረጽና 
ይዘት ለመረዳት ይቻላል፡፡” 
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instructions to the court in respect of the specific burden of proof borne by the 
accused as well as the nature of examination and assessment of the defence 
evidence.  
 4.4  Observations and Critique on the Binding Interpretation 
adopted in the Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie Case 
As some of the cases consulted demonstrate, the Amharic term “የማስረጃ ሸክም” or 
“የማስረዳት ግዴታ” are often indiscriminately used to refer to burdens borne by the 
parties without clearly identifying the distinction between evidential burden 
(ማስረጃ የማቅረብ ሸክም) and legal burden of proof (በማስረጃ የማረጋገጥ ሸክም). The 
Workineh Kenbato & Amelework Dalie Case and many other reported cases 
demonstrate this fact. Furthermore, in almost all cases highlighted above the 
courts did not attempt to indicate the particular standards of proof required from 
the respective parties to successfully discharge their respective burdens of proof. 
Besides, issues of burden and standard of proof have not been related with the 
constitutional principle of presumption of innocence and its legal implications. 
Most importantly, the natures and implications of the interrelationships between 
burdens of proof and presumptions, and between burdens of proof, presumptions 
and standards of proof should have been observed. This has led to lack of clarity 
on the operational features of the presumption embodied under Art 419 of the 
Criminal Code.  
As the cases indicate, judges could have paid particular attention to the 
specific factual matters towards which each of the litigating parties bears 
evidential and/or persuasive burdens of proof. The Cassation Division of the 
Federal Supreme Court has rightly identified some of the principal ingredients 
of the offence of possession of unexplained property which the public 
prosecutor bears the burden of proving in the Workineh Kenbato & Amelework 
Dalie Case. The Division held that the prosecutor bears burden of proof and 
must prove:87 the amount of income which an accused public servant (present or 
previous) is (or has been) earning; and, the extra (disproportionate or 
incommensurate) amount of money or property (vis-à-vis his lawful income) 
found in the possession of the accused, in his own name or in the name of his 
family. 
Moreover, the Cassation Division has rightly, though implicitly, recognized 
that proving the status of the accused during the alleged commission of the 
crime as a public servant (or as one who is or used to associate with a public 
servant accused of committing this crime during such time) is borne by the 
                                           
87 “ከወንጀል ሕግ Aንቀጽ 419 ንUስ Aንቀጽ 1 (ሀ) Eና (ለ) ድንጋጌዎች ለመረዳት የሚቻለው Aቃቤ ሕግ 
የመንግሥት ሠራተኛ የሆነው ወይም የነበረው ሰው ያገኝ የነበረውና የሚያገኘው ገቢ ምን ያህል Eንደሆነና 
የመንግሥት ሠራተኛው በራሱ ስምም ሆነ በቤተሰቡ ስም ከሕጋዊ ገቢው ውጭ ይዞት የሚገኘውን የገንዘብና 
የንብረት ግምት የማስረዳት ግዴታ ያለበት መሆኑን በግልጽ ደንግጔል፡፡” 
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prosecutor. But the Division did not take note that such an assessment of the 
income of the accused public servant has to be made within the period of check. 
It did not confine the search of extra amount of money or property of the 
accused to be within the period of interest after the entry into force of the 
Criminal Code. It has accepted what the prosecutor stated in its charge and tried 
to establish with evidence starting from Meskerem 1984 E. C (thirteen years 
before the criminalization of possession of unexplained property in Ethiopia). 
Of the estimated Birr 2,081,468.90 (alleged to be found under the control of the 
accused), the portion of money acquired during the period of check (from 
Ginbot 1, 1997 E.C until the time of charge) has not been duly established by 
the prosecutor. The Cassation Division did not comment, let alone quash, the 
decision of the Regional Supreme Court from this perspective.  Nothing has 
been stated in any of the judgements regarding the mens rea element of the 
offence. 
The Cassation Division has addressed the question of burden of proof in 
relation to the accused. It stated that the defendant in such cases bears “burden 
of proof”.  Although the Cassation Division did not indicate whether the term 
burden of proof (የማስረዳት ግዴታ) specifically refers to evidential burden or legal 
burden, further reading of the details in the judgment show that it refers to legal 
burden of proof.88 The Division held that an accused public servant and an 
                                           
88 “(ሀ) Aመልካቾች በስማቸው Eንዳለና ጫት፣Eንሰት፣ቡናና ሸንኮራ Aገዳ Eያለማን ገቢ Eናገኝበታለን ያሉትን 
2.25 ሄክታር መሬት በተመለከተ Aመልካቾች የEርሻ መሬቱ ባለይዞታ ናቸው ወይስ Aይደሉም? የEርሻ 
መሬቱ ባለይዞታ ከሆኑ የEርሻ መሬቱን በይዞታነት የያዙት መቼ ነው? መሬቱን በማልማት Iኮኖሚያዊ 
ጠቀሜታ ያላቸው የተለያዩ ተክሎች በማልማት ምርት ገቢ ማግኘት የጀመሩት መቼ ነው? ከመሬቱ 
የሚገኘው ገቢና መሬቱን ለማልማትና ምርቱን ለገበያ ለማቅረብ የሚወጣው ወጭ ምን ያህል ነው? 
Aመልካቾች ከመሬቱ ተጣርቶ የሚደርሳቸው ገቢ ምን ያህል ነው? የሚለው ፍሬ ጉዳይ በAግባቡና 
በገለልተኛ ባለሙያ ተጣርቶ ባልታወቀበት ሁኔታ ከቀበሌና ከዞኑ ግብርና ጽ/ቤት የተጻፉ ደብዳቤዎችን 
ብቻ መሠረት በማድረግ Aመልካቾች ከEርሻ የሚያገኙት ገቢ መጠን ከፍተኛ Eንደሆነ መወሰኑ በወንጀል 
ሕጉ Aንቀጽ 419(1) በAመልካቾች ላይ የሚደነግገውን የማስረዳት ግዴታ /burden of proof/ መሠረት 
በማድረግ ጉዳዩ ተጣርቶ የተወሰነ Aለመሆኑን የሚያሳይ በመሆኑ፣ 
(ለ) Aመልካቾች በባንክ ሂሳባቸው ውስጥ ከተገኘው ገንዘብ ውስጥ ብር 1,120,500 […] በAንደኛው Aመልካች 
ስም የተቀመጠ ከፊሉ የጋራራሙ ላንቶ የEንስሳት ማድለብ ኃላፊነቱ የተወሰነ የግል ማኅበር ገንዘብ ከፊሉ 
ደግሞ የጋልማ ባህላዊ ሎጅ ኃላፊነቱ የተወሰነ የግል ማኅበር መሆኑን ለማስረዳት የማኅበራቱ ቃለ-ጉባዔና 
Aባላት በማስረጃነት የቀረቡ መሆኑ በሥር ፍርድ ቤትና በይግባኝ ሰሚው ችሎት ውሳኔ ተገልጿል፡፡ ሆኖም 
በመጀመሪያ ደረጃ ኃላፊነታቸው የተወሰኑ የግል ማኅበራት የሚመሠረቱት የማኅበሩ ዋና ገንዘብ ልክና 
የማኅበሩ ዋና ገንዘብ በሙሉ መግባቱን የሚያስረዳ መግለጫ ሲቀርብ መሆኑ በንግድ ሕጉ Aንቀጽ 519 
ንUስ Aንቀጽ /መ/ Eና /ሰ/ በAስገዳጅነት የተደነገገ በመሆኑ Eነዚህ የንግድ ማኅበራት ሕጋዊ ሰውነት 
Aግኝተው ተመዝግበው ከሆነ ሲመዘገቡ ያስመዘገቡትና ገቢ ያደረጉት የማኅበሩ ዋና ገንዘብ ምን ያህል 
ነው? ማኅበራቱ በካፒታልነት ካስመዘገቡት ካፒታል በላይ በAመልካቾች ስም ለማኅበር መመሥረቻ 
የተዋጣ ገንዘብ Aለ በማለት የሚጽፉAቸው የተለያዩ ማስረጃዎች ሕጋዊ ተቀባይነት ያላቸው ናቸው ወይስ 
Aይደሉም? የሚሉት ነጥቦች ኃላፊነቱ የተወሰነ የግል ማኅበር  Aመሠራረት፣መዋጮ Aከፋፈል፣የማኅበሩ 
ዋና ገንዘብና ገንዘቡ ገቢ ስለሚሆንበት ሁኔታ የተቀመጡ ሕጋዊ መሥፈርቶችን መሠረት በማድረግ 
መጣራት የሚገባቸው ፍሬ ጉዳዮች ተጣርተውና ማስረጃዎቹ Aመልካቾች በወንጀል ሕጉ Aንቀጽ 419 
ንUስ Aንቀጽ 1 ያለባቸውን የማስረዳት ኃላፊነት መሠረት በማድረግ ተጣርተው ውሳኔ የተሰጠበት ሆኖ 
Aላገኘንም፡፡” 
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accomplice non-public servant bear burden of proof on one of the elements of 
the offence: namely, burden of proving the legitimate source (origin) of the 
extra amount of wealth found in one’s possession other than that amount which 
the prosecutor already established to be a legitimate income.89 While the 
Cassation Division has rightly identified this element of the offence which falls 
under the shoulder of the accused, the Division has unduly interpreted Art 
419(1) as imposing persuasive burden of proof on the accused, contrary to the 
principle of presumption of innocence.  
The Division arrived at such conclusion by focusing on the expression 
“….unless he gives a satisfactory explanation to the Court as to how he was 
able to maintain such a standard of living or how such pecuniary resources or 
property came under his control…” (“የዚህ ዓይነቱ የኑሮ ደረጃ Eንዴት ሊኖረው 
Eንደቻለ ወይም ያለው ንብረት ወይም የገንዘብ ምንጭ በEጁ Eንዴት ሊገባ Eንደቻለ ለፍርድ 
ቤት ካላስረዳ በስተቀር”) (Emphasis added). The Division did not consider the limited 
scope of this expression “... ለፍርድ ቤት ካላስረዳ በስተቀር” (“….unless he gives a 
satisfactory explanation to the Court”). This phrase does not imply persuasive 
burden of proof. What is required rather is explanation (ማስረዳት), not proving 
(ማረጋገጥ).  
Moreover, the Division did not notice that the explanation has to relate to 
“how he was able to maintain such a standard of living or how such pecuniary 
resources or property came under his control [emphasis added].” Contrary to 
the law, it maintained that the accused should prove the exact amounts of net-
incomes obtained from every identified and specific source. It required the 
defendants to convince the court about the amount of the net-income they 
derived from agricultural activities by producing a balance sheet that has been 
checked by a neutral a professional auditor.  It further required them to convince 
the court about the truthfulness of their allegation regarding the amount of 
money claimed to be belonging to the two private limited companies by 
producing what has been registered during the registration of the two 
companies. All these requirements are not envisaged under Art 419 of the 
Criminal Code; there is no single word or expression in this provision that 
requires an accused to produce evidence that establishes (proves) the exact 
amount of money/property derived from specific sources. Nor does the 
provision require the accused to convince judges about the truthfulness of each 
gross income, expenditure and net-income.  
                                           
89 The Court maintained: “በሌላ በኩል የመንግሥት ሠራተኛ የነበረው ሰውና ከEሱ ጋር በልዩ Aባሪነት 
የተከሰሰ ሰው የመንግሥት ሠራተኛው ሲያገኝ ከነበረውና ከሚያገኘው ገቢ በላይ ይዞት የተገኘው ገንዘብ ወይም 
ሀብት ትክክለኛው ምንጭ ምን Eንደሆነ የማስረዳት ግዴታ Eንዳለበት በወንጀል ሕጉ Aንቀጽ 419 ንUስ Aንቀጽ 
1 ሦስተኛ ፓራግራፍ […] በግልጽ ይደነግጋል፡፡ ከዚህም የምንረዳው Aቃቤ ሕግ በግልጽ ከሚታወቀው ሕጋዊ 
ገቢ በላይ ነው በማለት በክሱ የገለጸውንና በማስረጃ ያረጋገጠውን ሀብት ትክክለኛ ምንጭ የማስረዳት ግዴታ 
(Burden of Proof) በተከሳሾች ላይ የሚወድቅ መሆኑን ነው፡፡” 
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The Cassation Division has also considered the issue of standard of proof 
borne by the accused. Without saying anything about the standard of proof 
borne by the prosecutor, the Division first framed the issue of whether the 
accused persons bear the burden of persuasion or whether it suffices if they 
merely introduce some evidence that rebut some of the facts established by the 
prosecutor.90  The FSC Cassation Division invoked Art 419(1) of the Criminal 
Code, third paragraph, and concluded that the defendants bear the burden of 
persuading the court about the legitimate source of the extra amount of money 
and wealth which they possessed.91 Whether the accused are required to 
convince judges with a standard of proof that is ‘less than preponderant degree 
of proof’, or ‘equivalent to preponderant degree of proof’, or ‘equal to clear and 
convincing degree of proof’, or ‘equal to beyond a reasonable doubt standard of 
proof’, or ‘absolute certainty degree of proof’ is not explicitly stated.  
The analysis in the Cassation Division’s final order seems to endorse and 
impose a requirement of an absolute certainty degree of proof upon the 
accused.92 Such an interpretation clearly violates the principle of presumption of 
innocence enshrined under Art 20(3) of the Constitution and international 
instruments (which are integral part of Ethiopian law by virtue of Art 9(4) of the 
Constitution), namely: Art 11(1) of the UDHR, Art 14(2) of the ICCPR and Art 
7(1)(b) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.  It also deviates 
from the experience and judicial jurisprudence developed in other jurisdictions 
including the countries of origin of the idea of criminalization of illicit 
enrichment. The approach taken by the Cassation Division allows conviction of 
an accused person who fails to persuade judges about the truthfulness of one’s 
side of the story. According to the Division’s holding, it is possible to convict an 
accused person even if there are reasonable doubts about the truthfulness of the 
prosecutor’s allegations or even if the prosecutor’s and the defendant’s evidence 
are at equipoise.  
Conclusion  
In jurisdictions where the problem of corruption is widespread, the 
criminalization of illicit enrichment is adopted as a vital tool to reinforce the 
                                           
90 [ተከሳሾች በAቃቤ ግ ማስረጃ የተረጋገጠባቸውንና ሕጋዊ ከሆነው ገቢ በላይ የያዙትን ገንዘብና ሀብት] “ትክክለኛ 
ምንጭ የማስረዳት ግዴታና ኃላፊነት Aለባቸው ወይስ የAቃቤ ሕግን ክስና ማስረጃ ሊያስተባብሉ የሚችሉ 
Aንዳንድ ፍሬ ጉዳዮችን ለፍርድ ቤት ማቅረባቸው በቂ ይሆናል ወይስ Aይሆንም?” 
91 It concluded: “የተከሳሾች የማስረዳት ግዴታም Aቃቤ ሕግ በክሱ ከገለፀውና በማስረጃ ካረጋገጠው ውጭ 
ተከሳሾች ሌላ ገቢ የሚያገኙበት ሥራ ወይም የገቢ ምንጭ ያላቸው መሆኑን ብቻ ለፍርድ ቤቱ በማሳየት 
የሚወሰን ሳይሆን በAቃቤ ሕግ ክስና ማስረጃ ከተረጋገጠው ውጭ በEጅ Eንደተገኘ የተረጋገጠው ገንዘብና ሀብት 
ትክክለኛ ምንጭ ምን Eንደሆነ የማስረዳት ግዴታና ኃላፊነት ያለበት መሆኑን ከወንጀል ሕግ Aንቀጽ 419 ንUስ 
Aንቀጽ 1 ሦስተኛው ፓራግራፍ ድንጋጌ Aቀራረጽና ይዘት ለመረዳት ይቻላል፡፡” 
92 Supra, notes 88-91. 
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fight against this social evil. However, countries which are not severely 
threatened with corruption resort to civil and/or administrative measures and 
remedies to address the problem. Yet, the criminalization of illicit enrichment is 
increasingly gaining acceptance as a legitimate instrument against corruption.   
Apart from the incorporation of this offence in the 2004 Criminal Code, 
Ethiopia is a party to the UNCAC93 and the AUCPCC94.  Article 419 of the 
Criminal Code is clearly significant in the combat against corruption and as a 
tool to punish corrupt public servants and deprive them of their ill-gotten gains. 
Yet, there is the need for sufficient clarity on issues of burdens and standards of 
proof applicable in such prosecutions and on how this provision can be enforced 
without violating the right to presumption of innocence and other components of 
the right to fair trial and the right to private property.  
A case in point is the need to distinguish between evidential and legal 
burdens and the need to analyze and determine whether Art 419 of the Criminal 
Code imposes evidential or legal burden of proof upon the accused. Moreover, 
clarity is required regarding the degree of proof that has to be met to trigger the 
operation of the legal presumption, and also to obtain conviction of an accused. 
The element or issue which requires satisfactory explanation from the accused 
also needs to be clearly identified.  Furthermore, clarity is required regarding the 
degree of ‘proof’ imposed on the accused to meet ‘satisfactory explanation’.  
The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court gave an erroneous 
interpretation to Art 419 of the Criminal Code stating that the accused in such 
prosecutions is required to shoulder a persuasive burden of proof. The Division 
further erroneously implied that such a burden can only be discharged by a 
standard of proof that reaches to a proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This author 
hence submits that the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division should re-
consider and rectify such interpretation of Art 419 when it comes across another 
case that bears similar issues.  
The Division is indeed expected to identify the initial evidential and ultimate 
burdens of proof borne by prosecuting authorities, on the one hand, and the 
tactical and evidential burdens of “proof” borne by accused, on the other. This 
calls for the need to be clear on how the evidential presumption recognized 
under Art 419 becomes operational in each case and with regard to the various 
standards of proof applicable in such prosecutions throughout the trial and 
adjudication process. 
 Prosecutions under Art 419 of the Criminal Code are meant to deter corrupt 
public servants, deprive them of ill-gotten gains and facilitate the recovery of 
                                           
93 The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), 2003. 
94 The African Union Convention on Combating and Preventing Corruption 
(AUCPCC), 2003. 
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plundered public money and other assets. Meanwhile, it is of paramount 
importance to take all the necessary precaution against the violation of the 
constitutional principle of presumption of innocence until proven guilty and 
other fundamental human rights of accused persons. Moreover, utmost caution 
has to be taken not to interfere against the lawful property of accused 
individuals, their families and other third parties. As the experience of other 
jurisdictions such as Argentina, India, Hong Kong and many others 
demonstrate, Art 419 can indeed be enforced without unduly restricting and 
violating the right to fair trial and other fundamental human rights enshrined in 
the FDRE Constitution and international human rights instruments ratified by 
Ethiopia.                                                                                                                ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
